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Abstract
The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new accounts of qualitative
and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a
variety of interests, probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different frame-
works, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with respect to diverse types of un-
certainty, in particular the uncertainty on the credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which
arguments to consider, and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements.
Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a labelling-oriented
framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based argumentation and its (semi-) abstract ac-
count, along with diverse types of uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of
various kinds of uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question assertions
from the literature.
1 Introduction
Argumentation aims at supporting rational persuasion and deliberation in domains where no conclusive
logical proofs are available. It addresses defeasible claims raised on the basis of partial, uncertain and
possibly conflicting pieces of information. Argumentation has been a traditional concern for philoso-
phy and legal theory since Aristotle and Cicero, but only recently has become a focus for research in
artificial intelligence [1, 6].
There exists a variety of formal models capturing different aspects of the complexity of argu-
mentation activities. For instance, argument construction models (either rule-based or logic-based)
[40, 63, 21] need to be integrated with formal approaches for the evaluation of the acceptance status
of arguments, possibly at a more abstract level [12, 2]. Moreover, argument acceptance needs to be
projected on the statements corresponding to their conclusions, in order to assess their acceptance in
turn. In general, different aspects and their models need to be combined together to get a satisfactory
coverage of the full picture.
While argumentation-based reasoning enhances a system’s ability to reach defeasible determina-
tions under conditions of uncertainty and conflict, most formal approaches to argumentation suffer a
substantial limitation: they are unable to provide a comparative quantitative account of the persua-
siveness of alternative conclusions. Typically, argumentation systems either identify a single skeptical
outcome, or propose a set of credulous alternatives, without specifying corresponding degrees of cred-
ibility.
It has been convincingly argued that probability theory can help to fill the gap between qualitative
and quantitative accounts of uncertainty. For example, probabilistic methods may propagate quantified
uncertainties over (clusters of) premises into quantified uncertainties concerning the dialectical accept-
ability of arguments and conclusions. Hence, the combination of formal argumentation and probability
theory has received increasing attention in recent years.
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Different types of uncertainty, which can be the subject of probabilistic evaluation, can be iden-
tified in argumentation. For instance, there may be uncertainty about which premises to believe to
construct arguments. There can also be uncertainty about which arguments and relationships to con-
sider when an abstract representation of arguments and their relations is adopted. Then there can be
further uncertainty about the outcomes of the assessment, namely the acceptance status of arguments
and statements. This list is not exhaustive and all kinds of uncertainty are potentially appreciable and
meaningful.
Since different types of probabilistic uncertainty can be discerned and argumentation can be dealt
with at different level of abstraction, different families of approaches to probabilistic argumentation
can be found in the literature. First probabilistic notions have been investigated at different abstraction
levels, ranging from structured argumentation formalisms [47, 52, 48, 13] to abstract argumentation
frameworks [36, 59, 27, 30, 49, 50, 51]. Further, one can distinguish approaches based on the uncer-
tainty concerning the arguments to actually include in the argumentation process, as in the so-called
‘constellations’ approach [36, 27], and approaches focusing on a probabilistic notion of the acceptance
status of arguments, as in the ‘epistemic’ approach [59, 27, 30]. Existing approaches are thus hetero-
geneous and complementary, leading to the goal of setting up a general and unified framework able to
cover multiple types of probabilistic uncertainty in structured and abstract argumentation.
Contribution. Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation,we present a labelling-
oriented framework that we call probabilistic labellings and which covers uncertainty on inclusion of
argumentative pieces as well as uncertainty regarding acceptance of arguments or statements, even in
the case all the argumentative pieces are included in the reasoning activity.
To establish the framework of probabilistic labellings, we approach probabilistic argumentation
at various levels of abstraction. We start from a basic rule-based argumentation setting, then give a
semi-abstract account of it, and finally devise probabilistic labellings of arguments, and of statements
(an issue which has received limited attention in previous literature). Along this journey, the main
contributions are as follows:
• we introduce some non-traditional argument labellings, going beyond the three labels IN, OUT and
UN commonly used in the literature, to capture different kinds of uncertainty in a unified represen-
tation;
• we extend this unified labelling-based representation to statements corresponding to argument con-
clusions;
• we define a comprehensive set of probabilistic frames corresponding to different kinds of uncer-
tainty at different abstraction levels and analyse the relationships betwen them;
• we analyse the enhanced expressiveness of probabilistic labellings, with particular reference to
some influential probabilistic argumentation approaches in the literature.
We will refrain from discussing possible interpretations of probability values (such as classical,
frequentist or Bayesian views on these matters), and we will not investigate algorithms to compute
the probability of the status of arguments and statements, but redirect the readers to some relevant
literature.
Outline. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a minimalist rule-based
argumentation framework and a (semi-) abstract account featuring argumentation graphs. On this basis
we then introduce our generalised labelling approach for arguments and statements. In Section 3, we
present a set of probabilistic frames for argumentation, capturing uncertainty at different stages of
the argumentation process and leading to the main notion of probabilistic labellings of arguments and
statements. Section 4 analyses our proposal and its technical properties in relation with two influential
approaches to probabilistic argumentation, namely the ‘constellations’ approach and the ‘epistemic’
approach. We discuss relevant literature in Section 5, before concluding in Section 6. To help the
reader, key notations are summarised at the end of the paper.
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2 Labelling of Arguments and Statements
We assume a generic argumentation process which can be summarised as follows: arguments are
built out of a rule base; their relationships induce an argumentation graph; argument acceptance is
assessed on the basis of the argumentation graph through labelling semantics; and statement acceptance
is assessed on the basis of argument acceptance labellings. This section introduces a formalisation
of the various steps of the above process, which represents a necessary basis for our approach to
probabilistic argumentation. In particular, Subsection 2.1 introduces a simple rule-based formalism
and the relevant graph representation, while subsections 2.2 and 2.3 deal with argument and statement
labellings respectively. The overall schematisation of the argumentation process rests on the existing
literature and is not novel per se, while labellings to handle at the same time argument or statement
inclusion and (if included) argument or statement acceptance, as proposed in subsections 2.2 and 2.3,
provide an original generalisation of the traditional usage of labellings in the literature.
2.1 Argument construction and argumentation graphs
We first present a rule-based argumentation framework and its (semi-) abstract account, specifying
the structures on which we will develop our proposal. This rule-based argumentation framework is
‘minimalist’, that is, we avoid overloading it with features which are not relevant for our approach
to probabilistic argumentation. As for reference, this rule-based setting is akin to an argumentative
interpretation of Defeasible Logic [22, 34], with some definitions inspired by the ASPIC+ framework
[40]. Eventually, Dung’s abstract argumentation graphs [12] are slightly adapted to capture this rule-
based setting in an abstract way and to characterise different probabilistic argumentation frameworks
(see also [35] for an approach mapping ASPIC+ frameworks to a special kind of abstract frameworks,
called Extended Evidential Argumentation Frameworks).
The building blocks of the argumentation framework are atomic formulas (or atoms, i.e. formulas
with no propositional structures), from which literals are considered.
Definition 2.1 (Literal) A literal is an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula.
Definition 2.2 (Complementary literal) Given a literal ϕ, its complementary literal is a literal, de-
noted as −ϕ, such that if ϕ is an atom p then −ϕ is its negation ¬p, and if ϕ is ¬q then −ϕ is q.
We distinguish the negation ¬ from the negation as failure, denoted ∼, according to which ∼ ϕ indi-
cates the failure to derive ϕ.
The next construct regards rules that relate literals. For the sake of simplicity, we have only defea-
sible rules, i.e. in our context, rules that can be defeated by other rules.
Definition 2.3 (Defeasible rule) A defeasible rule is a construct of the form:
r : ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,∼ ϕ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ
′
m ⇒ ϕ
where
• r is the unique identifier of the rule;
• ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,∼ ϕ′1, . . . ,∼ ϕ
′
m (0 ≤ n and 0 ≤ m) is the body of the rule, and all the ϕi and ϕ
′
j are
literals;
• ϕ is the consequent (or head) of the rule, which is a single literal.
Notation 2.1 The body of a rule r is denoted Body(r). So given a rule as in Definition 2.3, we have
Body(r) = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,∼ ϕ
′
1, . . . ,∼ ϕ
′
m}.
Rules may lead to conflicting literals (we ensure later that two conflicting literals cannot be both
accepted). For this reason, we assume that a conflict relation is defined over the set of literals to express
conflicts in addition to those corresponding to negation.
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Definition 2.4 (Conflict relation) Given a set of literals Φ, a conflict relation ‘conflict’ is a binary
relation overΦ, i.e. conflict ⊆ Φ×Φ, such that for any ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Φ, if ϕ1 and ϕ2 are complementary,
i.e. ϕ1 = −ϕ2, then ϕ1 and ϕ2 are in conflict, i.e. (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ conflict.
The conflict relation may be further specified. For example, the relation may be refined with asymmet-
ric and symmetric conflicts to deal with contrary or contradictory literals as in [40]. However, treating
in detail such sophistications is not necessary for our purposes.
When two rules have heads in conflict, one rule may prevail over another one. Informally, a rule
superiority relation r1 ≻ r2 states that the rule r1 prevails over the rule r2.
Definition 2.5 (Superiority relation) Let Rules be a set of rules. A superiority relation ≻ is a binary
relation over Rules, i.e. ≻⊆ Rules×Rules, with r ≻ r′ denoting that r is superior to r′.
The superiority relation may enjoy some particular properties. For example, it may be antireflexive
and antisymmetric, so that for a rule r it does not hold that r ≻ r and for two distinct rules r and r′,
we cannot have both r ≻ r′ and r′ ≻ r. However, as for the conflict relation, treating in detail such
sophistications is not necessary for our purposes.
From a set of rules, a conflict relation and a superiority relation, we can define defeasible theories,
cf. [22, 34].
Definition 2.6 (Defeasible theory) A defeasible theory is a tuple 〈Rules, conflict,≻〉 where Rules
is a set of rules, conflict is a conflict relation over literals, and ≻ is a superiority relation over rules.
By chaining rules of a defeasible theory, we can build arguments as defined below, cf. [40].
Definition 2.7 (Argument) An argument A constructed from a defeasible theory
〈Rules, conflict,≻〉 is a finite construct of the form:
A : A1, . . . An,∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm ⇒r ϕ
where
• A is the unique identifier of the argument;
• 0 ≤ n and 0 ≤ m, and A1, . . . , An are arguments constructed from the defeasible theory
〈Rules, conflict,≻〉;
• ϕ is the conclusion of the argument A. The conclusion of an argument A is denoted conc(A), i.e.
conc(A) = ϕ;
• ∃r ∈ Rules such that r : conc(A1), . . . , conc(An),∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm ⇒ ϕ.
Definition 2.8 (Subarguments and rules) Given an argument A : A1, . . . An,∼ ϕ1, . . . , ∼ ϕm ⇒r
ϕ, the set of its subarguments Sub(A), the set of its direct subarguments DirectSub(A), the last
inference rule TopRule(A), and the set of all the rules in the argument Rules(A) are defined as
follows:
• Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A};
• DirectSub(A) = {A1, . . . , An};
• TopRule(A) = (r : conc(A1), . . . , conc(An),∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼ ϕm ⇒ ϕ);
• Rules(A) = Rules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪Rules(An) ∪ {TopRule(A)}.
Notation 2.2 The set of arguments constructed on the basis of a theory T is denotedArgs(T ).
According to Definition 2.7, an argument without subarguments has thus the form A : ∼ ϕ1, . . . ,∼
ϕm ⇒r ϕ with (0 ≤ m). ‘Infinite’ arguments are not considered, but we may have an infinite set of
finite arguments constructed from a defeasible theory.
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Example 2.1 (Running program) Suppose a research scientist is managing a project critically de-
pending on a program installed on a distant machine which is powered by a solar panel and a battery.
This program runs intermittently. The scientist has no explicit information about whether the pro-
gram is running, thus, a priori, its running status is undecided. However, if the scientist receives the
notifications that there is no solar power and no power from the battery, then the machine does not
have enough power, and therefore the program is not working. Such setting can give rise to different
scenarios, and to capture such scenarios, we refer to the literals given in Table 1.
Table 1: Literals and their meanings
¬b1 No solar power. ¬b No power.
¬b2 No battery power. c The program is running.
Based on these literals, we may form the defeasible theory T = 〈Rules, conflict,≻〉 where:
Rules= { r¬b1 : ⇒ ¬b1,
r¬b2 : ⇒ ¬b2,
r¬b : ¬b1,¬b2⇒ ¬b,
rc : ∼ ¬b ⇒ c,
r¬c : ⇒ ¬c },
conflict= { (c,¬c), (¬c, c) },
≻= ∅.
Based on the theory T, we can build the following arguments:
B1 : ⇒r¬b1 ¬b1 C : ∼ ¬b ⇒rc c
B2 : ⇒r¬b2 ¬b2 D : ⇒r¬c ¬c
B : B1,B2 ⇒r¬b ¬b
This example illustrates the concept of defeasible theories and the construction of arguments. We will
continue this example later in our probabilistic setting to determine a probability degree attached to
the acceptance that the program is running. 
Arguments may conflict and thus attacks between arguments may appear. We consider two types
of attacks: rebuttals (clash of incompatible conclusions) and undercuttings1 (attacks on negation as
failure premises). In regard to rebuttals, we assume that there is a preference relation over arguments
determining whether two rebutting arguments mutually attack each other or only one of them (being
preferred) attacks the other. The preference relation over arguments can be defined in various ways
on the basis of the preference over rules. For instance one may adopt the simple last-link ordering
according to which an argument A is preferred over another argument B, denoted as A ≻ B, if, and
only if, the rule TopRule(A) is superior to the rule TopRule(B), i.e. TopRule(A) ≻ TopRule(B).
We make no assumptions over the specific argument preference relation which is adopted. This leads
us to adopt the following definition of attack.
Definition 2.9 (Attack relation) An attack relation ; over a set of arguments A is a binary relation
over the set A, i.e. ;⊆ A×A. An argument B attacks an argumentA, i.e. B ; A, if, and only if, B
rebuts or undercuts A, where
• B rebuts A (on A′) if, and only if, ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) such that conc(B) and conc(A′) are in conflict,
i.e. conflict(conc(B), conc(A′)), and A′ 6≻ B;
• B undercuts A (on A′) if, and only if, ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) such that ∼ conc(B) belongs to the body of
TopRule(A′), i.e. (∼ conc(B)) ∈ Body(TopRule(A′)).
1The term undercutting is overloaded in argumentation literature and is used with different meanings in different contexts,
cf. [40].
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On the basis of arguments (and their subarguments) and attacks between arguments, we extend the
common definition of an argumentation framework [12] by introducing argumentation graphs which
comprise both attack and subargument relations. This is motivated by our upcoming probabilistic
account where the subargument relation, encompassed by most structured argumentation formalisms,
plays a key role. Intuitively, an argument cannot exist without its subarguments and can only be
believed if also its subarguments are believed.
From the definition of the sets of direct subarguments of an argument (see Definition 2.8), we can
straightforwardly define a direct subargument relation.
Definition 2.10 (Direct subargument relation) A direct subargument relation Z⇒ over a set of argu-
ments A is a binary relation over the set A, i.e. Z⇒⊆ A × A. An argument B is a direct subar-
gument of A, i.e. B Z⇒ A, if, and only if, B belongs to the set of direct subarguments of A, i.e.
B ∈ DirectSub(A).
By Definition 2.7, an argument is not a direct subargument of itself and cannot be a subargument
of its direct subarguments. Therefore, the direct subargument relation is antireflexive and acyclic.
Arguments and attack relations can be then captured in Dung’s abstract argumentation graphs,
called abstract argumentation frameworks in [12].
Definition 2.11 (Abstract argumentation graph) An abstract argumentation graph is a tuple 〈A,;〉
where A is a set of arguments, and ; is an attack relation overA.
It is equally possible to refer to semi-abstract argumentation graphs, where both the attack and the
subargument relations are encompassed, cf. [46].
Definition 2.12 (Semi-abstract argumentation graph) A semi-abstract argumentation graph is a tu-
ple 〈A,;, Z⇒〉 where A is a set of arguments, ; is an attack relation over A, and Z⇒ is a direct
subargument relation overA.
Notation 2.3 Given a semi-abstract argumentation graph G = 〈A,;, Z⇒〉, we denote A as AG, ;
as ;G and Z⇒ as Z⇒G.
Unconstrained semi-abstract argumentation graphs can be problematic. For instance cycles of the
subargument relations are not allowable. Moreover, as usual in structured argumentation formalisms
and reflecting the fundamental dependence of an argument on its subarguments, each attack against a
subargument is meant to be an attack against all its superarguments. Accordingly, taking inspiration
from [46, 14], we introduce the notion of well-formed argumentation graphs.
Definition 2.13 (Well-formed semi-abstract argumentation graph) A semi-abstract argumentation
graph 〈A,;, Z⇒〉 is well-formed if, and only if:
• the relation Z⇒ is acyclic and antireflexive;
• if an argumentA attacks an argument B, andB is a direct subargument of an argument C, then A
attacks C.
In a well-formed semi-abstract argumentation graph it is easy to see that, by recursion, if an argument
A attacks an argumentB then A attacks also all the superarguments of B.
Definition 2.14 (Argumentation graph constructed from a theory) An (abstract or semi-abstract)
argumentation graph G is constructed from a defeasible theory T if, and only if, AG is the set of all
arguments constructed from T .
Notation 2.4 An argumentation graph constructed from a defeasible theory T is denoted by GT .
From the facts that we exclude cyclic arguments and that the attack relation (Definition 2.9) refers
to subarguments, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 A semi-abstract argumentation graph constructed from a defeasible theory is well-
formed.
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Proof 2.1 The relation Z⇒ is acyclic and antireflexive. By Definition 2.9, if an argument A attacks an
argument B then A attacks all the superarguments of B, and thus A attacks every argument C such
that B is a direct subargument of C. Therefore, if an argument A attacks an argument B, and B is a
direct subargument of an argument C, then A attacks C.
In the remainder, we assume that all semi-abstract argumentation graphs are well-formed, and
accordingly, the qualification ‘well-formed’ is omitted.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) Using the definition of attacks and direct subarguments, we can
construct the semi-abstract argumentation graph as pictured in Figure 1.
B C D
B2B1
Figure 1: A semi-abstract argumentation graph. ArgumentB attacks C, argumentsC and D attack each
other. Arguments B1 and B2 are direct subarguments of argument B.

The definition of semi-abstract argumentation graphs allows us to give an account of probabilistic
argumentation which is intermediate between Dung’s abstract argumentation, encompassing attacks
only, and structured argumentation formalisms, where both the attack and the subargument relations are
defined in formalism-specific terms. Whilst this semi-abstract setting is built on the simple formalism
based on definitions 2.1-2.10, it can be more generally seen as an abstraction basis to encompass more
sophisticated rule-based argumentation systems (e.g. ASPIC+ [40]) or related non-monotonic logic
frameworks (e.g. Defeasible Logic [22]).
Semi-abstract argumentation graphs can be related to some existing proposals on different notions
of supports. For example, the representation is similar to the notion of inference graph introduced by
[44]. Bipolar argumentation frameworks [8] are an example of another semi-abstract settings in the lit-
erature encompassing two relations between arguments, namely attack and support. The generic notion
of support in bipolar argumentation frameworks allows for different interpretations (namely deductive
support, necessary support, and evidential support) with different properties and implications on the at-
tack relation. A specific notion of evidential support is considered in evidential argumentation systems
[42], where a special argument, denoted as η, is used to represent evidence (namely ‘incontrovertible
premises’) and evidential support, rooted in η, is ‘propagated’ through a set-based support relation.
Relationships and possibilities of translation between evidential argumentation systems and argumen-
tation frameworks with necessities are investigated in [43]. Our proposal does resort neither to specific
notions, like incontrovertible premises, nor to a specific evidence-based interpretation of the notion of
support. Our approach directly relies on the subargument relation which has a univocal interpretation
in our context and is sufficient to develop a general theory of probabilistic labellings. The inclusion of
more articulated notions, like recursive attacks and supports [3, 9], is beyond the scope of this work
and represents an interesting direction of future research.
Given an argumentation graph, some of the arguments may be omitted due to the use of some se-
lection criterion: this leads to consider subgraphs (which will be useful to specify fundamental statuses
of arguments in the next section.)
Definition 2.15 (Subgraph) Let G = (AG,;G, Z⇒G) denote an argumentation graph. The subgraph
H ofG induced by a set of argumentsAH ⊆ AG is an argumentation graph such thatH = (AH ,;G
∩(AH ×AH), Z⇒G ∩(AH ×AH)).
Notation 2.5 The set of all subgraphs of an argumentation graphG is denotedSub(G), i.e. Sub(G) =
{(AH ,;G ∩(AH ×AH), Z⇒G ∩(AH ×AH)) | AH ⊆ AG}.
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Not all subgraphs may be deemed to be well-formed or interesting, since only some of them corre-
spond to sensible constructions from a set of rules. For this reason we introduce subargument-complete
and rule-complete sets of arguments.
Definition 2.16 (Subargument-complete set) Let G = (AG,;G, Z⇒G) denote an argumentation
graph. A set of arguments AH ⊆ AG is subargument-complete if for any argument A in AH , all
the direct subarguments of A are in AH , i.e. ∀A ∈ AH , if ((B,A) ∈Z⇒G) then B ∈ AH .
Definition 2.17 (Rule-complete set) Let G = (AG,;G, Z⇒G) denote an argumentation graph. A
set of arguments AH ⊆ AG is rule-complete if for all arguments B in AG such that all the direct
subarguments of B are in AH and there exists an argument A in AH , such that the top rule of B
belongs to the rules of A, then B belongs to AH , i.e. ∀B ∈ AG, if DirectSub(B) ⊆ AH and
∃A ∈ AH such that TopRule(B) ∈ Rules(A), then it holds that B ∈ AH .
Notice that a set of arguments can be subargument-complete without being rule-complete and vice
versa. Therefore these two notions are complementary.
Subargument-complete or rule-complete sets of arguments can be straightforwardly used to qualify
subgraphs of an argumentation graph.
Definition 2.18 (Subargument-complete subgraph) A subgraph H = (AH ,;H , Z⇒H) of an argu-
mentation graph G induced by a set of arguments AH is subargument-complete if, and only if, AH is
subargument-complete.
In other words,H is a subargument-complete subgraph of G if any argument ofH appears with all its
supporting arguments andH has exactly the attacks and supports that appear in G over the same set of
arguments.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) In Figure 2 the graph (a) is a subargument-complete subgraph
of the graph in Figure 1, while the graph (b) is not.
B C
B2B1
(a)
B C
B1
(b)
Figure 2: Subargument-completeness.

Definition 2.19 (Rule-complete subgraph) A subgraph H = 〈AH ,;H , Z⇒H〉 of an argumentation
graphGT built from a defeasible theory T , and induced by a set of argumentsAH , is rule-complete if,
and only if, AH is rule-complete.
Example 2.2 (Abstract example) Consider a defeasible theory T = 〈Rules, ∅, ∅〉 such that:
Rules = { r1 : ⇒ a, r2 : ⇒ b,
r3 : a ⇒ b, r4 : b ⇒ c }.
We can build the following arguments:
A : ⇒r1 a, AB : ⇒r1 a⇒r3 b, ABC : ⇒r1 a⇒r3 b⇒r4 c
B : ⇒r2 b, BC : ⇒r2 b⇒r4 c.
The direct subargument relation Z⇒ is such that:
Z⇒= {(A,AB), (AB,ABC), (B,BC)}.
Consequently,
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• the argumentation graph GT = 〈{A,B,AB,BC,ABC}, ∅, Z⇒〉 is rule-complete and subargument-
complete;
• the argumentation subgraph H = 〈{A,B,AB,BC}, ∅, {(A,AB), (B,BC)}〉 is not rule-complete,
but it is subargument-complete.
This example shows that a subgraph of an argumentation graph built from a defeasible theory can be
subargument-complete without being rule-complete. 
Proposition 2.2 If an argumentation graph is constructed from a defeasible theory then it is subargument-
complete and rule-complete.
Proof 2.2 From Definition 2.14, an argumentation graph G constructed from a defeasible theory T is
a tuple 〈A,;, Z⇒〉 where A is the set of all arguments constructed from T . Thus, A is subargument-
complete and rule-complete. Therefore, G is subargument-complete and rule-complete.
As we will see, one may be interested in building a set of subargument-complete and rule-complete
subgraphs by considering ‘subtheories’ of a defeasible theory.
Definition 2.20 (Defeasible subtheory) Let T = 〈Rules, conflict,≻〉 denote a defeasible theory.
Given a set Rules′ ⊆ Rules, the defeasible subtheory U of T induced by Rules′ is the defeasible
theory U = 〈Rules′, conflict,≻ ∩(Rules′ ×Rules′)〉.
We will use such subtheories later in our probabilistic investigations.
Notation 2.6 The set of all the subtheories of a theory T = 〈Rules, conflict,≻〉 is denoted Sub(T ),
i.e. Sub(T ) = {〈Rules′, conflict,≻ ∩(Rules′ ×Rules′)〉 | Rules′ ⊆ Rules}.
To recap, starting from a defeasible theory, we can build arguments and identify the attack and sub-
argument relationships over arguments, thus creating an argumentation graph including its subgraphs.
The acceptance and justification status of the arguments in a graph needs then to be evaluated. The
next section discusses how these statuses can be determined by using labellings.
2.2 Labelling of arguments
Given an argumentation graph, the acceptance of arguments is evaluated on the basis of a formal
specification traditionally called argumentation semantics. This evaluation can be carried out in terms
of sets of arguments, called extensions, as originally proposed in [12], or in terms of labellings [2]. The
idea underlying the extension-based approach is to identify sets of arguments, called extensions, which
can collectively survive the conflict and therefore represent a reasonable position. In general, several
alternative extensions exist. The idea underlying the labelling-based approach is to describe each
reasonable position by a labelling, namely by assigning to each argument a label taken from a given
set. Traditional extension-based semantics have an equivalent labelling-based characterization using
the well-known set of three labels {IN, OUT, UN} which we also adopt here. Briefly, for each extension
E the corresponding labelling is defined as follows: each argument belonging to E is labelled IN,
each argument attacked by the extension is labelled OUT, every other argument is labelled UN. Other
approaches differing in the set of adopted labels and/or in the underlying semantics have been explored
in the literature (see e.g. [45, 65, 31, 70]). Our proposal is not bounded to the choice of a specific set
of labels or semantics and can be extended to other approaches too, a full development in this direction
is left to future work.
As a first step, we introduce a pair of labels devoted to capture a situation of uncertainty about the
presence of an argument within a framework. Traditionally the set of three labels {IN, OUT, UN} is used
to characterise the acceptance status of arguments on the basis of a given argumentation semantics.
However, in our context of uncertainty, a labelling needs also to be able to express the fact that an
argument is actually included and has some effect (let say it is ‘ON’) in the framework or that it is
actually not included and hence has no effect (let say it is ‘OFF’). Then, as we will see, ‘classic’
acceptance statuses ‘IN’, ‘OUT’ and ‘UN’ of arguments and the ON-OFF view can be seamlessly combined.
This combination will allow us to clearly distinguish the probability of ‘construction’ or ‘inclusion’ of
an argument and the probability of its acceptance.
Let us first introduce the basic formal notions and the relevant notation.
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Definition 2.21 (Labelling of a set of arguments) Let G be an argumentation graph, and ArgLab a
set of labels for arguments. An ArgLab-labelling of a set of arguments A ⊆ AG is a total function
L : A → ArgLab.
Notation 2.7 Given an argumentation graph G, the universe of all possible ArgLab-labelling assign-
ments of a set A ⊆ AG is denoted LArgLab(A).
In general a labelling involves an arbitrary set of arguments. When this set is a singleton, with a lit-
tle abuse of language we also speak of labelling of an argument. Labellings involving all the arguments
of an argumentation graph play a special role and deserve a specific terminology and notation.
Definition 2.22 (Labelling of an argumentation graph) LetG be an argumentation graph, andArgLab
a set of labels for arguments. An ArgLab-labelling of G is a total function L : AG → ArgLab.
Notation 2.8 Given an argumentation graphG, the universe of all possible ArgLab-labellings of G is
denoted LArgLab(G).
For instance, a {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling of G is a total function L : AG → {IN, OUT, UN}.
Notation 2.9 The set of arguments labelled with a label l by a labelling L is denoted l(L), i.e. l(L) =
{A|L(A) = l}. For instance, if IN is a label, then IN(L) = {A|L(A) = IN}.
Not all labellings in LArgLab(G) are meaningful or have satisfactory properties. Moreover, even
among meaningful labellings, one may identify those satisfying some specific requirements. Hence
typically, one needs to define some criteria to identify those labellings in LArgLab(G) which are mean-
ingful or interesting in some sense. Formally speaking, a specification identifies a subset of LArgLab(G)
for every possible argumentation graphG.
Definition 2.23 (Labelling specification) Given a set of labels ArgLab, anX-ArgLab-labelling spec-
ification identifies for every argumentation graph G a set of ArgLab-labellings of G denoted as
LXArgLab(G) ⊆ LArgLab(G), where X is called the criterion of the specification.
If a labelling L belongs to the set of some specified labellings LXArgLab(G), i.e.
L ∈ LXArgLab(G) ⊆ LArgLab(G), we say that the labelling L is an X-ArgLab-labelling of G, or an X
ArgLab-labelling (without the hyphen).
Definition 2.24 (Mono- and multi-labelling specification) AnX-ArgLab-labelling specification is a
mono-labelling specification if, and only if, |LXArgLab(G)| = 1 for any argumentation graphG, and it is
a multi-labelling specification if, and only if, |LXArgLab(G)| > 1 for some G.
As an anticipation of our probabilistic setting, we employ three types of labellings: {ON, OFF}-
labellings, {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings and {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings. In a {ON, OFF}-labelling, each
argument is associated with one label which is either ON or OFF to indicate whether an argument occurs,
that is, whether an argument is regarded as playing an active role or not in the graph. Intuitively,
arguments labeled OFF can be ignored. In a {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling, each argument is associated with
one label representing its status in the context of a semantics-based evaluation [2]. Intuitively, a label
‘IN’ means the argument is accepted, while a label ‘OUT’ indicates that it is rejected and ‘UN’ that it is
undecided, i.e. neither accepted nor rejected. A {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling extends a {IN, OUT, UN}-
labelling with the OFF label to indicate that an argument does not occur. Dually, a {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labelling can be regarded as a refinement of a {ON, OFF}-labelling where occurring (i.e. ON) arguments
are the subject of semantics-based evaluation.
Having introduced basic intuitions on some types of labellings, we need now to specify how actual
labellings of the various types can be built and which constraints they should satisfy. The simplest
specification for a given set of labels is the one without constraints, denoted as the all-ArgLab-labelling
specification.
Definition 2.25 (all-ArgLab-labelling specification) The all-ArgLab-labelling of an argumentation
graphG is such that LallArgLab(G) = LArgLab(G).
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Concerning {ON, OFF}-labellings, we will focus on specifications ensuring that the set of arguments
labelled ON features the completeness properties previously discussed.
Definition 2.26 (X-{ON,OFF}-labelling specification) Let G denote an argumentation graph. A
{ON, OFF}-labelling L of G is
• subargument-complete if, and only if, ON(L) is subargument-complete;
• rule-complete if, and only if, ON(L) is rule-complete;
• legal if, and only if, ON(L) is subargument-complete and rule-complete.
Example 2.2 (continuing from p. 9) A legal {ON, OFF}-labelling and a subargument-complete
{ON, OFF}-labelling (which is not legal because it is not rule-complete) are pictured in Figure 3.
AON
ABON
ABC
ON
B ON
BC ON
(a)
AON
ABON
ABC
OFF
B ON
BC ON
(b)
Figure 3: A legal {ON,OFF}-labelling (a), and a subargument-complete {ON,OFF}-labelling which is not
legal (b) .

We can note that {ON, OFF}-labellings can be mapped to subgraphs: intuitively they correspond to
‘switching off’ arguments outside a given subgraph.
Definition 2.27 ({ON,OFF}-labelling with respect to a subgraph) Let G denote an argumentation
graph, and H a subgraph of G. The {ON, OFF}-labelling of G with respect to H , denoted as LG,H , is
such that for every argumentA in AG, it holds that:
• A is labelled ON if, and only if, A is in AH , and
• A is labelled OFF otherwise.
Proposition 2.3 LetG denote an argumentation graph constructed from a defeasible theory T , andH
any subgraph constructed from a subtheory U of T , i.e. U ∈ Sub(T ). The {ON, OFF}-labelling of G
with respect to H is legal.
Proof 2.3 If an argumentation (sub)graph H is constructed from a defeasible (sub)theory then H
is subargument-complete and rule-complete (Proposition 2.2). Thus, AH is subargument and rule-
complete (Definition 2.18 and 2.19). Consequently, every {ON, OFF}-labelling L of G with respect to
H is such that ON(L) is subargument and rule-complete. Therefore, every {ON, OFF}-labelling L of G
with respect to H is legal (Definition 2.26) .
Turning to {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings, we follow the well-known labelling-based approach to argu-
mentation semantics reviewed in [2]. In a nutshell, given an argumentation graph G and a set of
labels, an argumentation semantics associates with the graph G a subset of the set of all possible
{IN, OUT, UN}-labellings of the graphG. Note that, in our generalised setting, argumentation semantics
can be introduced as an instance of labelling specification (Definition 2.23).
Definition 2.28 (Argumentation semantics) An argumentation semantics is an X-{IN, OUT, UN}-
labelling specification.
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Every argumentation semantics X in the literature satisfies the property of being conflict-free (ab-
breviated cf), that is, for every argumentation graphGLX{IN,OUT,UN}(G) ⊆ L
cf
{IN,OUT,UN}(G) as defined
below.
Definition 2.29 (Conflict-free {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling specification) A conflict-free
{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling (or cf-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling) of an argumentation graphG is a {IN, OUT, UN}-
labelling such that for every argumentA inAG it holds thatA is labelled IN if, and only if, all attackers
of A are not labelled IN.
Several literature semantics (and in particular all the semantics introduced in [12]) are based on
complete semantics: its definition as a specification for complete labellings is recalled below.
Definition 2.30 (Complete {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling specification) A complete {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling
of an argumentation graph G is a {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling such that for every argument A in AG it
holds that:
• A is labelled IN if, and only if, all attackers of A are OUT, and
• A is labelled OUT if, and only if, A has an attacker IN.
Since a complete {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling is total, if an argument is neither labelled IN nor OUT, then this
argument is labelled UN.
In general an argumentation graph may have several complete {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings: complete-
based semantics, like the grounded, preferred and stable semantics, recalled below, provide additional
specifications among the complete labellings.
Definition 2.31 (Grounded {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling specification)
A grounded {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling L of an argumentation graph G is a complete {IN, OUT, UN}-
labelling of G such that IN(L) is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among all complete {IN, OUT, UN}-
labellings of G.
Definition 2.32 (Preferred {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling specification)
A preferred {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling L of an argumentation graph G is a complete {IN, OUT, UN}-
labelling of G such that IN(L) is maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among all complete {IN, OUT, UN}-
labellings of G.
Definition 2.33 (Stable {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling specification)
A stable {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling L of an argumentation graph G is a complete {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling
of G such that UN(L) is empty.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) A grounded {IN, OUT, UN}-labellingwhich is also a preferred and
stable {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling is pictured in Figure 4.
B
IN
C
OUT
D
IN
B2
IN
B1
IN
Figure 4: A grounded {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling which is also a preferred and stable {IN,OUT,UN}-labelling.

The traditional literature distinction between single status and multiple status argumentation se-
mantics corresponds to our notions of mono-labelling and multi-labelling respectively (see Definition
2.24). For example, the grounded {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling semantics is mono-labelling, while the pre-
ferred {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling semantics is multi-labelling.
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A few other semantics may be considered, see [2], but this is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
We are now ready to introduce the novel {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings as a way to combine a le-
gal {ON, OFF}-labelling with {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings of the subgraph induced by the set of arguments
labelled ON. Intuitively, this corresponds to combine together legality and semantics criteria.
Definition 2.34 (X-{IN,OUT,UN,OFF}-labelling specification) Let G denote an argumentation
graph, and H a subargument-complete subgraph of G. A {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling of G is an X-
{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling with respect toH if, and only if:
• every argument in AH is labelled according to anX-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling of H , and
• every argument in AG\AH is labelled OFF.
As for terminology, the X-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling is called the sublabelling of the X-
{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling specification.
The above definitions can be instantiated. For example, Definition 2.34 can be used to define the
grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling of an argumentation graph.
Definition 2.35 (Grounded {IN,OUT,UN,OFF}-labelling specification) Let H be a subargument-
complete subgraph of an argumentation graph G. A grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling of G with
respect to H is a {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling such that:
• every argument in AH is labelled according to the grounded {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling ofH , and
• every argument in AG\AH is labelled OFF.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) A grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling and a preferred (and
stable) {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling are pictured in Figure 5.
B
OFF
C
UN
D
UN
B2
OFF
B1
IN
(a)
B
OFF
C
OUT
D
IN
B2
OFF
B1
IN
(b)
Figure 5: A grounded {IN,OUT,UN,OFF}-labelling (a), and a preferred {IN,OUT,UN,OFF}-labelling (b).

An argumentation graph G has a unique grounded {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling, but it has as many
grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings as subgraphs ofG. Therefore, the grounded-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labelling specification is in general multi-labelling. More generally, theX-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling
specification is multi-labelling, even though its sublabelling semantics is mono-labelling.
Argument labellings produced by the semantics evaluation are called argument acceptance la-
bellings. On the basis of argument acceptance labellings, it is possible to aggregate the acceptance
statuses into a justification status for every considered argument, resulting into argument justification
labellings.
In non-probabilistic settings, the justification status of an argument is usually determined with
respect to all the labellings in the set of labellings LXArgLab(G) identified by an X-ArgLab-labelling
specification, by using the traditional notions of skeptical and credulous justification. In particular, an
argument is skeptically justified if it is labelled IN by all labellings in LXArgLab(G), while it is credulously
justified if it is labelled IN by at least one labelling in LXArgLab(G), and it is not justified otherwise.
This simple notion of argument justification can be generalised considering a generic set of justifi-
cation states, represented by a set of labels JArglabels, and a function producing a JArglabels-labelling
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ofG on the basis of the labellings LXArgLab(G). The traditional approach can be regarded as an instance
of this general scheme where JArglabels = {SKJ, CRJ, NOJ} and the function is as specified above. The
reader may refer to [5] for a wider formal treatment of this generalised labelling approach. We focus
here only on the aspects which are necessary for the development of the present paper. In particular,
the extension of the set of argument labels to {IN, OUT, UN, OFF} calls for an extended set of argument
justification labels too. As a minimum, since an argument can be always ignored (labelled OFF by all
LXArgLab(G)) an additional justification label is needed to cover this case. On this basis, we introduce
the ‘semi-skeptical’ {OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-labelling.
Definition 2.36 (Semi-skeptical{OFJ,SKJ,CRJ,NOJ}-labelling) Let L denote a non-empty set of
{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings of an argumentation graph G. The semi-skeptical {OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-
labelling LJ of G with respect to L is a {OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-labelling such that for every argument A
in AG, it holds that:
• A is labelled OFJ, i.e. LJ(A) = OFJ, if, and only if, ∀L ∈ L, L(A) = OFF;
• A is labelled SKJ, i.e. LJ(A) = SKJ, if, and only if, ∀L ∈ L, L(A) = IN;
• A is labelled CRJ, i.e. LJ(A) = CRJ if, and only if, ∃L ∈ L : L(A) = IN and LJ(A) 6= SKJ;
• otherwise A is labelled NOJ, i.e. LJ(A) = NOJ.
The ‘semi-skeptical’ {OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-labelling is only one of the many options in the design
space of argument justification labellings. Its application is exemplified below, while further investiga-
tions about alternative notions of argument justification in the extended context we are exploring are
left to future work. In this respect, we remark that introducing uncertainty in argumentation requires re-
vising the formalisation in all the phases of the process, some of which have received relatively limited
attention until now.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) Assume the set of {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings L as previously
illustrated in Figure 5 (two labellings). The semi-skeptical {OFJ, SKJ,CRJ,NOJ}-labelling with respect to
L is illustrated in Figure 6.
B
OFJ
C
NOJ
D
CRJ
B2
OFJ
B1
SKJ
Figure 6: A semi-skeptical {OFFJ, SKJ,CRJ,NOJ}-labelling.

The semi-skeptical {OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-labelling is obviously total because the label NOJ covers all
cases not covered by the other labels, but we can nevertheless define NOJ in more specific terms, as
follows.
Proposition 2.4 Let L denote a non-empty set of observed argument labellings. It holds that LJ(A) =
NOJ if, and only if, ∃L ∈ L,L(A) = OUT or L(A) = UN and ∀L ∈ L,L(A) 6= IN.
To recap, given an argumentation graph, the acceptance and justification statuses of arguments
can be expressed according to a variety of labelling specifications. To encompass uncertainty about
the inclusion/omission of arguments, we introduced two additional labels indicating inclusion (‘ON’)
or omission (‘OFF’). We showed how existing labelling specifications can be gently adapted in that
regard, and we introduced an upgraded notion of argument justification. On this basis, statements can
be labelled in turn, as we will see next.
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2.3 Labelling of statements
The final phase of the process concerns the labelling of statements, and in particular the labelling of
the conclusions supported by arguments. As a matter of fact, assessing conclusions is the ultimate goal
of the argumentation process. For instance, in Example 2.1 the research scientist wants to form an
opinion about whether the program is running or not. In the remainder of this section, we focus on the
labelling of statements which are, in our case, literals.
Labellings of statements can be performed in different manners, see e.g. [5]. From an abstract point
of view, given a set of statements − where a statement may not be the conclusion of any argument− a
labelling of this set is a function associating every statement with a label.
Definition 2.37 (Labelling of literals) Let Φ denote a set of literals, and LitLabels denote a set of
labels on literals. A LitLabels-labelling of Φ is a function K : Φ→ LitLabels.
Per se, a labelling of literals is just a function mapping a set of literals to a set of labels, but such a
labelling may rely on an acceptance labelling of arguments. For this reason, we introduce an acceptance
labelling function as follows.
Definition 2.38 (Acceptance labelling of literals) LetG denote an argumentation graph,LXArgLab(G)
the set of X-ArgLab-labellings of the argumentation graph G, Φ a set of literals, and LitLabels a set
of labels on literals. An acceptance LitLabels-labelling of Φ is a function K : LXArgLab(G)×Φ →
LitLabels.
Example 2.3 If we write K(L, ϕ) = in, then it means that, given the argument labelling L, the literal
ϕ is labelled in. 
It is often desirable that the considered labelling function is total, and we assume total labelling
functions in the remainder.
Different specifications for labellings of statements are possible. A simple labelling is the so-
called bivalent labelling, according to which a statement is either justified or not, without further
sophistication. If a statement is accepted then it is labelled in, otherwise it is labelled no. In this case,
the necessary and sufficient condition for a statement to be labelled in is to have at least one argument
labelled IN supporting this statement.
Definition 2.39 (Bivalent labelling of literals) LetG denote an argumentation graph,LXArgLab(G) de-
note the set of X-ArgLab-labellings of the argumentation graph G, and Φ denote a set of literals. A
bivalent {in, no}-labelling of Φ is a total function K : LXArgLab(G),Φ→ {in, no}, such that ∀ϕ ∈ Φ:
• ϕ is labelled in, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = in, if and only if ∃A ∈ IN(L) : conc(A) = ϕ, i.e. there is at least
one argument A such that
– this argument A is labelled IN in L, and
– the literal ϕ is the conclusion of argument A;
• ϕ is labelled no otherwise, i.e K(L, ϕ) = no.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) Consider the grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling L as given
in Figure 5, the bivalent labelling of the set of literals supported by the arguments is such that
K(L,¬b1) = in, K(L,¬b2) = no, K(L,¬b) = no, K(L, c) = no, and K(L,¬c) = no. 
The bivalent labelling is simple, but it takes no advantage of the fine-grained labelling of arguments.
For this reason, we may consider more sophisticated labellings concerning the statuses of statements
supported by no arguments labelled IN. So, following the same spirit underlying {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labelling for arguments, we propose the novel worst-case sensitive labellings where the labels out, un,
off and unp are considered together with in.
Definition 2.40 (Worst-case sensitive labelling of literals) Let G denote an argumentation graph,
LXArgLab(G) the set of X-ArgLab-labellings of the argumentation graph G, and Φ a set of literals.
A worst-case sensitive {in, out, un, off, unp}-labelling of Φ is a total function K : LXArgLab(G),Φ →
{in, out, un, off, unp}, such that ∀ϕ ∈ Φ:
• ϕ is labelled in, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = in, if, and only if, ∃A ∈ IN(L) : conc(A) = ϕ, i.e. there is at least
one argument A such that
– this argument A is labelled IN in L, and
– the literal ϕ is the conclusion of argument A.
• ϕ is labelled out, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = out, if, and only if, ∃A ∈ OUT(L) : conc(A) = ϕ and ∀A :
conc(A) = ϕ, A ∈ OUT(L) ∪ OFF(L), i.e.
– there is at least one argument whose conclusion is ϕ, which is not labelled OFF in L, and
– all arguments whose conclusion is ϕ are labelled OUT or OFF in L.
• ϕ is labelled un, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = un, if, and only if, 6 ∃A ∈ IN(L) : conc(A) = ϕ and ∃A ∈ UN(L) :
conc(A) = ϕ, i.e.
– there is no argument labelled IN in L whose conclusion is ϕ, and
– there is at least one argument labelled UN in L whose conclusion is ϕ.
• ϕ is labelled off, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = off, if, and only if, ∃A : conc(A) = ϕ and ∀A : conc(A) = ϕ
A ∈ OFF(L), i.e.
– there is at least one argument in L whose conclusion is ϕ, and
– all arguments whose conclusion is ϕ are labelled OFF in L.
• ϕ is labelled unp, i.e. K(L, ϕ) = unp, if, and only if, 6 ∃A : conc(A) = ϕ, i.e. there is no argument
labelled in L whose conclusion is ϕ.
The labels out, un, off and unp can be seen as a finer classification of the cases corresponding to the
no label: with the label out all arguments concluding ϕ are either switched off or plainly rejected, with
un at least one of them is undecided, with off they are all switched off. Finally, the label unp caters for
queries about a statement for which there is no argument (we use the label unp as an abbreviation for
‘unprovable’). The name of this labelling reflects a distance from acceptance, so out is worse than un
which is worse than off, which is worse than unp.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) Consider the grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling L as given
in Figure 5, the worst-case sensitive labelling of the set of literals supported by the arguments is such
that K(L,¬b1) = in, K(L,¬b2) = off, K(L,¬b) = off, K(L, c) = un, and K(L,¬c) = un. 
Other labels and types of labellings for statements can be considered, in particular a notion of
statement justification can also be investigated, but the labellings introduced here are sufficient to
illustrate our probabilistic framework, as we will see in the next section.
To summarise the section, we have considered a minimalist but articulated formal framework cov-
ering the various phases of a rule-based argumentation process. In this framework, arguments are
constructed from defeasible theories by chaining defeasible rules. Some arguments can attack or be
subarguments of other arguments, and these relations amongst arguments are captured into abstract ar-
gumentation graphs. Then, the acceptance status of arguments can be expressed in terms of labellings
specified by an argumentation semantics. The acceptance labellings are in turn the basis for a labelling-
based definition of argument justification and statement acceptance. In addition to existing labelling
specifications, we considered two novel labels indicating the inclusion (‘ON’) or omission (‘OFF’) of
arguments. We showed how existing labelling specifications can be gently adapted in that regard.
As we will see next, this framework will allow us to investigate and compare different probabilistic
argumentation settings, leading us to a labelling-oriented approach called probabilistic labellings.
3 Probabilistic Labelling of Arguments and Statements
Building on the framework introduced in Section 2, we are now ready to present, as the main contri-
bution of the paper, a systematic approach to encompass probabilistic uncertainty in this context. In
particular, we consider several possible answers to the question ‘which are the elements we are un-
certain about?’, which, adopting Kolmogorov axioms, amounts to identify various alternatives for the
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definition of the probability space. To this purpose, we will first introduce probabilistic argumentation
frames (Subsection 3.1), and then we will consider their use for probabilistic labellings of arguments
(Subsection 3.2) and statements (Subsection 3.3).
3.1 Probabilistic argumentation frames
Different probability spaces can provide a basis for probabilistic argumentation, each featuring dif-
ferent types of uncertainty. In that regard, we can distinguish probability spaces featuring some un-
certainty on the argumentative structures, namely defeasible theories or argumentation graphs, and
probability spaces focusing on the uncertainty on the acceptance of arguments. We investigate these
alternatives in the remainder.
3.1.1 Structural uncertainty: probabilistic theory and graph frames
Since arguments are built on the basis of a defeasible theory, one may consider uncertainty at the level
of the theory itself, that is, given a reference set of defeasible rules, uncertainty about which subset
of rules to adopt. In this view, the sample space corresponds to the set of subtheories of a defeasible
theory, leading to the definition of probabilistic theory frames (PTFs).
Definition 3.1 (Probabilistic theory frame) A probabilistic theory frame (PTF) based on a defeasible
theory T is a tuple 〈T, 〈ΩPTF, FPTF, PPTF〉〉 where 〈ΩPTF, FPTF, PPTF〉 is a probability space such
that:
• the sample space ΩPTF is the set of subtheories of T , i.e. ΩPTF = Sub(T );
• the σ-algebra2 FPTF is the power set of ΩPTF, i.e. FPTF = 2ΩPTF;
• the function PPTF from FPTF to [0, 1] is a probability distribution satisfying Kolmogorov axioms.
Notation 3.1 The (infinite) set of the PTFs based on a defeasible theory T (differing on the probability
function P ) is denoted PTF (T ).
Every subtheory U of a theory T generates exactly one argumentation graph GU , thus uncertainty
about the set of rules also corresponds to being uncertain about the induced argumentation graph among
the subgraphs ofGT . For this reason, one may decide to adopt a representation at a more abstract level,
where, given a reference argumentation graph, there is uncertainty about which of its subgraphs should
be actually taken into account, leading to the definition of probabilistic graph frames (PGFs).
Definition 3.2 (Probabilistic graph frame) A probabilistic graph frame (PGF) based on an argu-
mentation graph G is a tuple 〈G, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉 where 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉 is a probability
space such that:
• the sample space ΩPGF is the set of subgraphs of G, i.e. ΩPGF = Sub(G);
• the σ-algebra FPGF is the power set of ΩPGF, i.e. F = 2ΩPGF ;
• the function PPGF from FPGF to [0, 1] is a probability distribution satisfying Kolmogorov axioms.
Notation 3.2 The (infinite) set of the PGFs based on an argumentation graph G (differing on the
probability function P ) is denoted PGF (G).
The relation from the subtheories of a theory T to the subgraphs of GT is neither injective nor sur-
jective. Non injectivity is due to the fact that it may be the case GU = GU ′ with U 6= U ′ i.e. different
subtheories may generate the same graph. This is due to the fact that subtheories may differ due to
the presence of rules which are actually not used in the construction of any argument. Non suriectivity
2An algebra of sets is a collection C of subsets of a given set S such that (i) S ∈ C, (ii) ifX ∈ C and Y ∈ C thenX∪Y ∈ C,
(iii) if X ∈ C then S\X ∈ C. The collection C is also closed under intersections. A σ-algebra is additionally closed under
countable unions (and intersections): (iv) If Xn ∈ C for all n, then
⋃
∞
n=0
Xn ∈ C [32]. Note that, while we specify the
σ-algebra as a power set, it may be specified differently. We adopt here the most common specification, which appears to us as
the most ‘natural’ for our purposes.
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is due to the fact that for every subtheory U , GU is subargument-complete and rule-complete, while
Sub(GT ) typically includes also subgraphs not satisfying these properties. This has an effect on the
correspondence from PTFs to PGFs defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 (PGF corresponding to a PTF) Given a PTF 〈T, 〈ΩPTF , FPTF, PPTF〉〉, its corre-
sponding PGF is a PGF tuple 〈GT , 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉 where the probability distribution PPGF is
such that ∀S ∈ FPGF:3
PPGF(S) =
∑
{U∈Sub(T )|GU∈S}
PPTF({U}).
Notation 3.3 The PGF corresponding to a PTF F is denoted PGF (F).
Applying Definition 3.3 to the case of singletons, we get that the distribution PPGF is such that for
every subgraphH in Sub(G),
PPGF({H}) =
∑
{U∈Sub(T )|GU=H}
PPTF({U}). (1)
Given that for every subtheoryU ∈ Sub(T ) the graphGU is subargument-complete and rule-complete,
it follows also that for every subgraph H in Sub(G) which is not subargument-complete or rule-
complete it holds that PPGF({H}) = 0. Hence, the mapping between the sample space of a PTF and
its corresponding PGF may be neither injective nor surjective.
Example 2.2 (continuing from p. 9) Consider the PTF 〈T, 〈ΩPTF, FPTF, PPTF〉〉 and its corre-
sponding PGF 〈GT, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉. Figure 7 shows the mapping from ΩPTF to ΩPGF, where
each graph is represented by the arguments belonging to it. The mapping is clearly neither injective nor
surjective. An arbitrary probability distribution on the subtheories of T is given and the corresponding
distribution on the subgraphs of GT is shown. 
Given a defeasible theory T , the set of PGFs based on the subgraphs of GT is a strict superset of
the set of PGFs that can be generated starting from the PTFs based on T . Formally:
PGF (GT ) 6⊇ {PGF (F) | F ∈ PTF (T )}. (2)
This is because, for every PTF F in PTF (T ), PGF (F) is such that the subgraphs ofGT which are not
subargument-complete and rule-complete have probability zero, while PGF (GT ) includes also PGFs
not satisfying this constraint.
Hence, PGFs are stricty more expressive than PTFs as far uncertainty about the actual graph to be
considered is concerned. When moving from a PTF to a corresponding PGF, some information is also
lost due to non-injectivity: in general many different PTFs may generate the same PGF. However, this
loss of information has no practical effects, since if two PTFs generate the same PGF, the difference
between them has no influence on the subsequent argumentation steps.
PTFs and PGFs capture two related forms of structural uncertainty. PTFs refer to uncertainty about
the structure of the theory to be used, while PGFs refer to the (consequent) uncertainty about which
arguments are present in an argumentation graph. Now, a distinct but possibly coexisting kind of
uncertainty not involving structural aspects can be considered too, as investigated next.
3.1.2 Acceptance uncertainty: probabilistic labelling frames
Acceptance uncertainty refers to the fact that, given an argumentation graph, a semantics may pre-
scribe multiple acceptance labellings for it, each representing individually a reasonable outcome of the
conflict resolution process. The agent carrying out argument-based reasoning is then confronted with
the choice of one among these outcomes. Indeed, choosing one of the reasonable options is manda-
tory to avoid standstill, at least in practical reasoning contexts, as exemplified by the famous Buridan’s
3It is assumed that a sum over the empty set is 0, i.e. PPGF(S) = 0 if {U ∈ Sub(T ) | GU ∈ S} = ∅.
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r1 r2 r3 r4 PPTF A B AB BC ABC PPGF
U1 1 1 1 1 1/16 H1 1 1 1 1 1 1/16
U2 1 1 1 0 2/16 H2 1 1 1 1 0 0/16
U3 1 1 0 1 0/16 H3 1 1 1 0 1 0/16
U4 1 1 0 0 1/16 H4 1 1 1 0 0 2/16
U5 1 0 1 1 1/16 H5 1 1 0 1 0 0/16
U6 1 0 1 0 1/16 H6 1 1 0 0 0 1/16
U7 1 0 0 1 0/16 H7 1 0 1 0 1 1/16
U8 1 0 0 0 2/16 H8 1 0 1 0 0 1/16
U9 0 1 1 1 1/16 H9 1 0 0 0 0 2/16
U10 0 1 1 0 1/16 H10 0 1 0 1 0 2/16
U11 0 1 0 1 1/16 H11 0 1 0 0 0 2/16
U12 0 1 0 0 1/16 H12 0 0 0 0 0 4/16
U13 0 0 1 1 0/16
U14 0 0 1 0 0/16
U15 0 0 0 1 3/16
U16 0 0 0 0 1/16
Figure 7: Non-injective non-surjective mapping from the sample space (of subtheories Ui) of the con-
sidered PTF (on the left) to the sample space of its corresponding PGF (on the right).
donkey example. One may therefore want to express quantitative uncertainty about which option, i.e.
which acceptance labelling, to choose. Clearly this kind of acceptance uncertainty is ‘orthogonal’ to
structural uncertainty and is outside the scope of PTFs and PGFs.
To address acceptance uncertainty, we devise a sample space which is the set of possible labellings
of an argumentation graph, as previously employed in [49, 50, 51], and resulting into what we call
probabilistic labelling frames (PLFs) that we investigate in the remainder of this section.
PLFs are based on the assumption that, given anX-ArgLab-labelling specification for an argumen-
tation graph G, an agent can assign a probability to every labelling of the set of labellings LXArgLab(G)
which represents the sample space. Intuitively, this can be interpreted as follows: the X-ArgLab-
labelling specification gives rise to a first, uncertainty free, selection of the set of labellings LXArgLab(G)
that are worth considering within the universe LArgLab(G). Then the labellings in LXArgLab(G) may not
be regarded as equally probable and hence associated with different probability values. Note that, at
this abstract level, we do not commit to any specific meaning of the probability of a labelling belong-
ing to LXArgLab(G). For instance, in an epistemic reasoning scenario, different probability values may
correspond to the fact that an agent, according to some domain-specific information, views the various
labellings as differently credible, while in a social argumentation context, the probability values may
correspond to the expectation that a specific labelling is approved by the members of a community.
Our framework, being application agnostic, provides a uniform formal model to investigate general
properties valid for a large family of probabilistic argumentation scenarios, each of which can be char-
acterised by the adopted labelling specification and, possibly, by additional specific properties.
Notation 3.4 Whilst our notational nomenclature refers toX-ArgLab-labellings (e.g. legal-{ON, OFF}-
labellings, complete-{IN, OUT, UN}-labellings, complete-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings and so on)
where X and ArgLab refers to an X-ArgLab-labelling specification, for the sake of notational con-
ciseness we will sometimes speak of S-labellings, using a single symbol S to synthesise the pair of
symbolsX-ArgLab.
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Definition 3.4 (Probabilistic labelling frame) A probabilistic labelling frame (PLF) based on an ar-
gumentation graphG is a tuple4 〈G,S, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉where S denotes anX-ArgLab-labelling
specification, and 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉 is a probability space such that:
• the sample space ΩPLF is the set ofX-ArgLab-labellings of G, i.e. ΩPLF = LXArgLab(G);
• the σ-algebra FPLF is the power set of ΩPLF, i.e. FPLF = 2ΩPLF ;
• the function PPLF from FPLF to [0, 1] is a probability distribution satisfying Kolmogorov axioms.
Thanks to the versatility of labellings, PLFs feature enhanced expressiveness with respect to PGFs.
In fact PGFs can be regarded as a special case of PLFs with ArgLab = {ON, OFF}, as illustrated by the
following definition.
Definition 3.5 (PLF corresponding to a PGF) Given a PGF 〈G, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉, its corre-
sponding PLF is a PLF tuple 〈G, all-{ON, OFF}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉 where the probability distribu-
tion PPLF is such that ∀S ∈ FPLF:
PPLF(S) =
∑
{H∈Sub(G) |LG,H∈S}
PPGF({H}).
Notation 3.5 The PLF corresponding to a PGF F is denoted as PLF (F).
Given a PGF based on an argumentation graph G, one can draw different mappings from the ele-
ments of the sample space ΩPGF = Sub(G) to the elements of the sample space of a PLF based onG,
depending on the adopted labelling specification. As mentioned above, if one adopts the all-{ON, OFF}
specification every element of ΩPGF, i.e. every subgraph of G, corresponds exactly to an element
of ΩPLF, i.e. to a {ON, OFF}-labelling and vice versa. If instead one adopts an X-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}
specification whereX is a multiple status argumentation semantics, in general for each subgraphH of
G there are many corresponding elements in ΩPLF, namely the set of X-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings
of G corresponding to the set ofX-{IN, OUT, UN}-labellings of H . However, a reverse correspondence
can be drawn as follows.
Definition 3.6 (PGF corresponding to a PLF)
Given a PLF 〈G,S, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉, its corresponding PGF is a PGF tuple
〈G, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉 where the probability distribution PPGF is such that ∀S ∈ FPGF:
PPGF(S) =
∑
{L∈ΩPLF |G(L)∈S}
PPLF({L})
where G(L) is the subgraph of G induced by the set of arguments which are not labelled OFF in L,
namely, letting X = A \ OFF(L), G(L) = (X ,;G ∩(X × X ), Z⇒G ∩(X × X )).
The correspondence is illustrated in Example 3.1. If X is single status the sets mentioned above are
singletons and the mapping between ΩPGF and ΩPLF is bijective.
Example 3.1 (Abstract example II) Let us consider a PGF 〈G, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉 and a
PLF 〈G, preferred-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉 with the argumentation graph G =
〈{B,C}, {(B,C), (C,B)}〉 as pictured in Figure 8 .
B C
Figure 8: A simple argumentation graph.
Figure 9 shows the mapping from the sample space ΩPLF to ΩPGF, a given probability distribution on
ΩPLF, and the corresponding distribution on ΩPGF.

4Later we will often omit the subscript PLF for the sake of conciseness.
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B C PPGF B C PPLF
H1 1 1 0.8 L1 IN OUT 0.4
H2 1 0 0.2 L2 OUT IN 0.4
H3 0 1 0 L3 IN OFF 0.2
H4 0 0 0 L4 OFF IN 0
L5 OFF OFF 0
Figure 9: Mapping from the sample space of the considered PLF (on the right) to the sample space of
the relevant PGF (on the left) for the argumentation graph of Figure 8.
Since PGFs are more expressive than PTFs, as far as uncertainty about the actual argumentation
graph is concerned, this correspondence shows that also PLFs are strictly more expressive than PTFs
in this respect. Further, one can also extend the non-injective non-surjective relationship from PTFs to
PGFs (see Definition 3.3) to the corresponding PLFs.
While PLFs using {ON, OFF}-labellings are able to encompass the uncertainty about argumentation
graphs expressed by PTFs and PGFs, PLFs using {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings can express uncertainty about
the actual labelling to choose in a multiple status semantics with a fixed argumentation graph, thus cov-
ering the acceptance uncertainty dimension alone. More interestingly, PLFs using {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labellings are able to combine both kinds of uncertainty in a single representation. As discussed later,
this allows to capture some existing literature approaches as special cases of PLFs, providing at the
same time a comprehensive formalism to combine them.
To recap, we have laid down different kinds of probabilistic frames, namely PTFs, PGFs and (the
novel concept of) PLFs, each kind featuring a different probability space. We showed that PLFs sub-
sume PTFs and PGFs, and for this reason, we will focus on PLFs in the remainder. Before studying the
relationships between PLFs with other works, we will see next that such PLFs are convenient to attach
probabilistic measures to different statuses of arguments and to investigate their relationships.
3.2 Probabilistic labelling of arguments
The generalised framework introduced in the previous sections provides the basis for introducing fur-
ther notions related to the reasoning tasks an agent can be interested in. For instance, an agent may
focus attention on a few arguments which are most significant for his/her purposes, and be interested
in the labels that can be assigned to these arguments and in the relevant probabilities both at the level
of argument acceptance and of argument justification.
3.2.1 Probabilistic argument acceptance labellings
In order to define probabilistic argument acceptance labellings, we introduce suitable random variables
on the basis of the generic probabilistic space introduced for PLFs.
Recall that a random variable is a function (traditionally denoted by an upper case letter as X , Y
or Z for example) from Ω into another set E of elements. An assignment of a random variable X is
denoted as X = e where e ∈ E. An assignment for a set of random variables {X1, . . . , Xn} is simply
a set {X1 = e1, . . . , Xn = en} of assignments to all variables in the set.
For every argument A, we use a categorical random variable called a random labelling denoted
LA from Ω into a set ArgLab of labels such as {ON, OFF}, or {IN, OUT, UN} or {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}. So,
for instance, if the sample space Ω is a set of {ON, OFF}-labellings, the event LA = ON is a shorthand
for the outcomes {L|L ∈ Ω,L(A) = ON}. If the sample space Ω is a set of {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings
or {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings, then LA = ON is a shorthand for the outcomes {L|L ∈ Ω,L(A) =
IN or L(A) = OUT or L(A) = UN}.
Notation 3.6
• Sets of random labellings are denoted using upper boldface type. So L denotes a set of random
labellings {LA1, . . . , LAn}.
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• Assignments to (sets of) random labellings are denoted using boldface type. For instance, given
a set of random labellings L = {LA1, . . . , LAn}, a possible assignment is l = {LA1 =
ON, . . . , LAn = OFF}.
• An assignment to a set of random labellings can be straightforwardly mapped to a labelling, and for
this reason, an ‘assignment’ may be also called a ‘labelling’ in the remainder. When the distinction
is made, and for the sake of compactness, the labelling L corresponding to an assignment l is
denoted Ll. To make a bridge with our notation for labellings and to avoid any ambiguity, we write
lA = l to say that the random labelling of argument A is assigned the value l according to the
assignment l.
• The joint distribution over a set L = {LA1, LA2, . . . , LAn} of random labellings is for-
mally denoted P ({LA1, LA2, . . . , LAn}), but following standard notation, we will write it
P (LA1, LA2, . . . , LAn).
From the definition of random variables, the probability of an assignment l for a set of random
labellings is the sum of the probabilities of the labellings Ll in the sample space where this assignment
occurs:
P (l) =
∑
Ll∈Ω
P ({Ll}). (3)
Consequently, if the assignment concerns only one argument A, then the marginal probability of
the status of this argumentA is the sum of the probabilities of the labellings in the sample space where
this assignment occurs:
P (LA = l) =
∑
L∈Ω:L(A)=l
P ({L}). (4)
Example 3.1 (continuing from p. 20)
Suppose the PLF 〈G, preferred-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉 has a distribution as indi-
cated in Figure 9. By Equation 4, we can compute the marginal probability that arguments B or C
obtain a certain acceptance status, as follows.
PPLF(LB = IN) = PPLF({L1}) + PPLF({L3}) (= 0.6)
PPLF(LB = OUT) = PPLF({L2}) (= 0.4)
PPLF(LB = UN) = 0
PPLF(LB = OFF) = 0
PPLF(LC = IN) = PPLF({L2}) (= 0.4)
PPLF(LC = OUT) = PPLF({L1}) (= 0.4)
PPLF(LC = UN) = 0
PPLF(LC = OFF) = PPLF({L3}) (= 0.2)

Since a random labelling is a random variable, we get directly the desirable property that the prob-
abilities of the different labels for an argument sum up to 1.
Proposition 3.1 Let 〈G,X-ArgLab, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF.∑
l∈ArgLab
P (LA = l) = 1.
From Proposition 3.1, for anyX-{ON, OFF}-labelling specification, we obtain:
P (LA = ON) + P (LA = OFF) = 1. (5)
For anyX-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling specification, we have:
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OUT) + P (LA = UN) = 1. (6)
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For anyX-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling specification:
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OUT) + P (LA = UN) + P (LA = OFF) = 1. (7)
Stable labellings enjoy more specific properties given that no argument can be labelled UN, and
therefore, for the stable-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling specification, we have:
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OUT) = 1. (8)
For the stable-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labelling specification:
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OUT) + P (LA = OFF) = 1. (9)
Other results on the probability of argument acceptance statuses can be derived. We will review some
of them in the remainder.
3.2.2 Probabilistic argument justification labellings
We now move to explore how uncertainty on argument acceptance may in turn affect argument justi-
fication: in this respect, different considerations can be drawn depending on the set of labels adopted
in the underlying PLF. PLFs based on {ON, OFF}-labellings express uncertainty about the structure
of the framework and this simple set of labels does not carry significant information about argument
justification. The situation is different for PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN} or {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings.
Assuming a (possibly random) selection of a unique acceptance labelling amongst a set of
{IN, OUT, UN} or {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings, we can then distinguish argument justification status be-
fore this selection (which in the present proposal is specified by Definition 2.36) and argument justifi-
cation status after the selection. The latter is directly determined by the unique selected labelling, and,
by Definition 2.36 in this restricted case, only three justification labels are possible, namely OFJ, SKJ,
and NOJ: after selection of a unique acceptance labelling, an argumentA gets the justification label OFJ
if and only if A is labelled OFF in the selected labelling, SKJ if and only if it is labelled IN in the selected
labelling, and NOJ if and only if it is labelled OUT or UN in the selected labelling.
So, if one assumes, as we do, that an agent at some point makes a definite choice of a unique ac-
ceptance labelling among the alternative acceptance labellings produced by a semantics, the traditional
notion of argument justification is somehow redundant, since it is related to argument acceptance by
direct and simple relationships and some justification notions, like credulous acceptance, actually are
not relevant. Argument justification keeps its role if one assumes instead that an agent does not have to
choose among the alternative labellings but rather needs to draw a sort of synthetic view about them.
Both scenarios make sense in different contexts, the former appearing more suitable for practical rea-
soning, i.e. reasoning about what to do, the latter for epistemic reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what to
believe. Further discussions of these aspects are beyond the scope of the present paper and are left to
future work. We just observe that, in the latter scenario, it is possible to identify a relationship between
the justification status of an argument and PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings, provided that
one assumes that each labelling has non zero probability.
Proposition 3.2 Let 〈G,X-ArgLab, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, L ⊆ LXArgLab(G) a non-empty set of ar-
gument labellings such that for every labelling L ∈ L P ({L}) > 0, and LJ the semi-skeptical
{OFJ, SKJ, CRJ, NOJ}-labelling of G. For every argument A in AG, it holds that:
• LJ(A) = OFJ if, and only if, P (LA = OFF) = 1;
• LJ(A) = SKJ if, and only if, P (LA = IN) = 1;
• LJ(A) = CRJ if, and only if, 0 < P (LA = IN) < 1;
• LJ(A) = NOJ if, and only if, P (LA = OUT) > 0 or P (LA = UN) > 0, and P (LA = IN) = 0.
Proof 3.1 Let us make a proof for each justification label.
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OFJ. From Definition 2.36, LJ(A) = OFJ if, and only if, ∀L ∈ L, L(A) = OFF.
We have ‘∀L ∈ L, L(A) = OFF’ if, and only if, P (LA = OFF) = 1.
Therefore, LJ(A) = OFJ if, and only if, P (LA = OFF) = 1.
SKJ. From Definition 2.36, LJ(A) = SKJ if, and only if, ∀L ∈ L, L(A) = IN. We have ‘∀L ∈ L,
L(A) = IN’ if, and only if, P (LA = IN) = 1. Therefore, LJ(A) = SKJ if, and only if, P (LA =
IN) = 1.
CRJ. From Definition 2.36, LJ(A) = CRJ if, and only if, ∃L ∈ L: L(A) = IN and LJ(A) 6= SKJ; and
1. ∃L ∈ L,L(A) = IN, if, and only if, P (LA = IN) > 0.
2. LJ(A) 6= SKJ if, and only if, ∃L ∈ L: L(A) 6= IN. That is, LJ(A) 6= SKJ if, and only if,
P (LA = IN) < 1.
Therefore, LJ(A) = CRJ if, and only if, 0 < P (LA = IN) < 1.
NOJ. From Proposition 2.4, LJ(A) = NOJ if, and only if, ∃L ∈ L, L(A) = OUT or L(A) = UN, and
∀L ∈ L,L(A) 6= IN.
Therefore, LJ(A) = NOJ with respect to L if, and only if, P (LA = OUT) > 0 or P (LA = UN) >
0, and P (LA = IN) = 0.
Example 3.1 (continuing from p. 20) ArgumentsB andC are both credulously justified, i.e., LJ(B) =
CRJ and LJ(C) = CRJ. 
To recap, PLFs are a convenient basis to define probabilistic measures about the acceptance status
of arguments and to derive some essential properties. Turning to argument justification labelling, we
showed that, under suitable hypotheses, it is possible to identify a relationship between the justification
status of an argument and PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings. Probabilistic measures con-
cerning statement labellings and their relationships can be also derived on the basis of PLFs, as we will
see in next section.
3.3 Probabilistic labelling of statements
The probabilistic labelling of statements directly follows from the probabilistic labelling of arguments.
We introduce, as we did for random labellings of arguments, random variables concerning the labelling
of statements. For any literal ϕ, we introduce a categorical random variable which is denotedKϕ and
which can take value in the set of labels LitLabels of a considered LitLabels-labelling of literals. These
random variables are also called random labellings.
The marginal probability of a literal labelled k is the sum of labellings in the sample space where
the literal is labelled as such:
P (Kϕ = k) =
∑
{L∈Ω |K(L,ϕ)=k}
P ({L}). (10)
SinceKϕ is a random variable, the sum of marginal probabilities over its possible assignments equals
1.
Proposition 3.3 Let 〈G,S, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF andϕ a literal. For any LitLabels-labelling of literals,∑
k∈LitLabels
P (Kϕ = k) = 1.
Proposition 3.3 can be instantiated with different statement labellings. For example, given a PLF
〈G,S, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 and the bivalent {in, no}-labellings, we have:
P (Kϕ = in) + P (Kϕ = no) = 1 (11)
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while in case of worst-case sensitive {in, out, un, off, unp}-labellings we obtain:
P (Kϕ = in) + P (Kϕ = out) + P (Kϕ = un) + P (Kϕ = off) + P (Kϕ = unp) = 1. (12)
Note that either P (Kϕ = unp) = 0 or P (Kϕ = unp) = 1, since, given a set of arguments, there is no
uncertainty on the fact that a literal ϕ is the conclusion of at least one argument or none in the set.
Proposition 3.4 Let 〈G,S, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, and ϕ1 and ϕ2 literals in conflict, i.e.
conflict(ϕ1, ϕ2) and let us consider the bivalent {in, no}-labellings and the worst-case sensitive
{in, out, un, off, unp}-labellings,
P (Kϕ1 = in) + P (Kϕ2 = in) ≤ 1.
Proof 3.2 In a given labelling a literal ϕ1 is labelled in or not. If the literal ϕ1 is labelled in then
there is an argument A labelled IN such that conc(A) = ϕ1. Then it must be the case that this
argument attacks or is attacked by every other argument A′ such that conc(A′) = ϕ2 and given the
basic conflict-freeness property satisfied by any argumentation semantics it can not be the case that
any such argument A′ is labelled IN in the same labelling. Hence also ϕ2 cannot be labelled in in the
same labelling. If instead the literal ϕ1 is not labelled in, then any conflicting literal ϕ2 can labelled
in or not. Let Kϕ1,in denote the set of labellings of arguments such that ϕ1 is labelled in, Kϕ2,in the
set of labellings of arguments such that ϕ2 is labelled in, and K the complement set of labellings
Ω\Kϕ1,in ∪ Kϕ2,in. These three sets form a partition of Ω, thus: P (Kϕ1,in) + P (Kϕ2,in) + P (K) = 1.
Since P (K) ≥ 0, we have P (Kϕ1,in) + P (Kϕ2,in) ≤ 1, therefore P (Kϕ1 = in) + P (Kϕ2 = in) ≤ 1.

The next proposition is a corollary which follows from propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
Proposition 3.5 Let 〈G,S, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, and ϕ1 and ϕ2 literals in conflict, i.e.
conflict(ϕ1, ϕ2). Let us consider the bivalent {in, no}-labellings and the worst-case sensitive
{in, out, un, off, unp}-labellings,
P (Kϕ1 = in) ≤ P (Kϕ2 6= in)
where
• P (Kϕ2 6= in) = P (Kϕ2 = no) in the case of bivalent {in, no}-labellings;
• P (Kϕ2 6= in) = P (Kϕ2 = out) + P (Kϕ2 = un) + P (Kϕ2 = off) + P (Kϕ2 = unp) in the case
of worst-case sensitive {in, out, un, off, unp}-labellings.
Both propositions (3.4) and (3.5) feature inequalities which are consequences of the fact that
argumentation does not necessarily fulfil (an argumentation counterpart of) the principle of excluded
middle, since it is possible, for example, to have outcomes where, for any statement, neither a
statement nor its complement are labelled in – they may be both labelled no for instance. These
propositions can also be viewed as an expression of a probabilistic notion of consistency: it is not
possible to regard two conflicting statements as highly probable at the same time, because a statement
can be believed at most as much as any conflicting statement is disbelieved.
In the following, we provide a complete example of use of the various probabilistic notions we
have introduced in this section.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) The research scientist is asked to report on the degree of uncer-
tainty concerning whether the critical program will be running or not at any point of time of the project.
To help her, we decide to use the approach of probabilistic labellings.
Firstly, we deal with uncertainty at the level of the rules. The solar panels work well but they only
provide power during daytime, thus, assuming that daytime and nighttime are equal, at any point of
time there is 50% probability that there is enough solar power, i.e. that the rule r¬b1 applies. The
battery is partially damaged, and only one expert over five advances the argument concluding that the
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r¬b1 r¬b2 r¬b rc r¬c PPTF
U1 0 0 1 1 1 0.4
U2 1 0 1 1 1 0.4
U3 0 1 1 1 1 0.1
U4 1 1 1 1 1 0.1
Figure 10: Subtheories with non-zero probability.
battery cannot provide power, giving rise to a probability of 0.2 that the rule r¬b2 is considered. All
other rules are not affected by uncertainty. Under a reasonable assumption of independence, this gives
rise to a PTF as drawn in Figure 10 where PPTF({U1}) = 0.4, PPTF({U2}) = 0.4, PPTF({U3}) =
0.1, PPTF({U4}) = 0.1 and the probability of all other subtheories is zero.
The PGF corresponding to this PTF, as illustrated in Figure 11, is such that the full argumentation
graph 〈{B1,B2,B,C,D}, {(B,C), (C,D), (D,C)}, {(B1,B), (B2,B)}〉 has probability 0.1, while the
subgraphs induced by the sets of arguments {B2,C,D}, {B1,C,D} and {C,D} have probabilities 0.1,
0.4, and 0.4 respectively.
B1 B2 B C D PPGF
G1 0 0 0 1 1 0.4
G2 1 0 0 1 1 0.4
G3 0 1 0 1 1 0.1
G4 1 1 1 1 1 0.1
Figure 11: Argumentation subgraphs with non-zero probability.
The expert has a skeptical stance, and thus she can decide to adopt grounded {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labellings. Accordingly, the argument labellings illustrated in the left part of Figure 12 are generated
and we get a PLF where P ({L1}) = 0.4, P ({L2}) = 0.4, P ({L3}) = 0.1, P ({L4}) = 0.1.
B1 B2 B C D P ¬b1 ¬b2 ¬b c ¬c
L1 OFF OFF OFF UN UN 0.4 off off off un un
L2 IN OFF OFF UN UN 0.4 in off off un un
L3 OFF IN OFF UN UN 0.1 off in off un un
L4 IN IN IN OUT IN 0.1 in in in out in
Figure 12: Argument and statement labellings with grounded semantics, with non-zero probability.
The corresponding statement labellings according to Definition 2.40 are illustrated in the right
part of Figure 12 from which the following probabilistic labelling of statements can be derived.
P (K¬b = in) = P ({L4}) (= 0.1)
P (K¬b = off) = P ({L1}) + P ({L2}) + P ({L3}) (= 0.9)
P (Kc = un) = P ({L1}) + P ({L2}) + P ({L3}) (= 0.9)
P (Kc = out) = P ({L4}) (= 0.1)
P (K¬c = in) = P ({L4}) (= 0.1)
P (K¬c = un) = P ({L1}) + P ({L2}) + P ({L3}) (= 0.9)
Altogether, we have derived that, using the skeptical stance of grounded labellings , the overall
probability of rejection of statement c (‘the program is running’) is 0.1 while the probability of accep-
tance of ¬c (‘the program is not running’) is estimated at 0.1. The status of c and ¬c is regarded as
undecided with a probability 0.9. 
To summarise this section, we have considered different kinds of frames for probabilistic argu-
mentation, namely PTFs, PGFs and (the novel concept of) PLFs, each frame featuring a different
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probability space. While, with suitable labels, PLFs are able to encompass the uncertainty about ar-
gumentation graphs expressed by PTFs and PGFs, PLFs can also express uncertainty about the final
labelling outcome, thus covering a further uncertainty dimension. Considering thus PLFs as a general
approach for probabilistic argumentation, we derived some results concerning probabilistic measures
of argument and statement labellings.
4 On Uncertainty about Inclusion and Acceptance Status
PLFs are an expressive and flexible formalism able to capture various kinds of uncertainty because, in
addition to the ‘traditional’ acceptance labels IN, OUT and UN, we have introduced labels ON and OFF to
account for the ‘inclusion’ status of arguments. In this section, we further develop the analysis of this
increased expressiveness by discussing, at a technical level the relationships between our proposal and
the treatment given in [27] of two influential approaches to probabilistic argumentation, namely the
constellations approach (Subsection 4.1) and the epistemic approach (Subsection 4.2), finally leading
to a possible combination (Subsection 4.3). This is achieved by both carrying out a conceptual anal-
ysis and proving some technical properties, which provide a basis for a wider discussion of relevant
literature at a general level in Section 5.
4.1 Constellations approach
In the constellations approach, originally investigated in [36], every argument and attack of an argu-
mentation graph is associated with a ‘likelihood’. In this section we discuss the development of this
idea presented in [27], while other works related to the constellations approach (e.g. [11]) are discussed
in Section 5.
We first recall the definition of probabilistic argumentation graphs (PAGs) from [27] where a prob-
ability is directly associated with each argument.
Definition 4.1 (Probabilistic argumentation graph) A probabilistic argumentation graph (PAG) is a
tuple 〈A,;, PPAG〉 where 〈A,;〉 is an abstract argumentation graph and PPAG : A → [0, 1].
The sample space is left implicit, but the interpretation, quoting [27], is that given an abstract argumen-
tation graph G one ‘can treat the set of subgraphs of G as a sample space, where one of the subgraphs
is the “true” argumentation graph.’
In [27], the probability of a subgraph H of G induced by a set of arguments AH ⊆ AG is not
derived from any form of axiomatisation but is directly defined as the following product (Definition 14
of [27]):
PPAG(H) =
( ∏
A∈AH
PPAG(A)
)
×

 ∏
A/∈AH
(1− PPAG(A)

 . (13)
Equation 13 relies on the assumption that for each argumentA, the probability ofA appearing in the
‘true’ argumentation graph is independent of the probability of appearance of every other argument.
This is motivated by the justification perspective adopted in [27]: ‘knowing that one argument is a
justified point does not affect the probability that another is a justified point’. This perspective leads to
assume that an assignment of probability values to arguments is given as initial information. Quoting
again [27], for each argumentA, P (A) ‘is the probability that A exists in an arbitrary full subgraph of
G, and 1− P (A) is the probability that A does not exist in an arbitrary full subgraph of G’.
The assumption of arguments being probabilistically independent contrasts with our proposal
where no assumptions of probabilistic independence is made and, actually, the subargument relation
constrains the appearance of arguments in a subgraph. In particular, in the rule-based context we pro-
posed for PTFs, a probability assignment over the subtheories of a theory T is used as a starting point.
Then, the probability of a subgraphH is the sum of the probabilities of the subtheories generatingH ,
as evidenced in Definition 3.3. Hence, our framework distinguishes and combines logical dependences
and probabilistic dependences. Nevertheless, in our setting, if the appearance of arguments is assumed
independent, then any PAG and its notion of ‘true’ argumentation graph can be captured by a PGF as
follows.
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Definition 4.2 (PGF corresponding to a PAG) Given a PAG 〈A,;, PPAG〉, the corresponding PGF
is a tuple 〈G, 〈ΩPGF, FPGF, PPGF〉〉 whereG = 〈A,;〉 and the probability distribution PPGF is such
that ∀S ∈ FPGF:
PPGF(S) =
∑
H∈S
PPAG(H).
The difference between the approach in [27] and ours can be explained by the fact that in the ar-
gumentation model based on classical logic adopted in [27] there is no explicit notion of subargument:
an argument is a pair 〈Φ, α〉 where Φ is a minimal consistent set of formulae such that Φ ⊢ α. In this
perspective every argument is self-contained. We note however that it may be the case that there are
two arguments 〈Φ, α〉, 〈Φ′, β〉 such that Φ ⊆ Φ′; then it may appear problematic to assume that the
appearance of 〈Φ′, β〉 is independent of the appearance of 〈Φ, α〉.
A detailed discussion of the differences between logic-based and rule-based argumentation being
beyond the scope of this paper, we remark that our approach provides a formal example of the le-
gality constraints binding abstract representations like PGFs and PLFs, when considering the actual
underlying argument construction process. This example can be useful as a starting point to investigate
analogous legality constraints in other argumentation formalisms. Moreover the labelling representa-
tion of the constellations approach through PLFs based on {ON, OFF}-labellings simplifies the analysis
of some basic properties, which, again, can be employed as a term of comparison in other formalisms.
This is illustrated by the following propositions, whose proofs are straightforward.
First, the probability of inclusion of an argument cannot be greater than the probability of inclusion
of its subarguments.
Proposition 4.1 Let 〈G, legal-{ON, OFF}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, and let A andB denote two arguments
in AG such that A is a subargument of B.
P (LB = ON) ≤ P (LA = ON).
Further, the probability of appearance of an argument A is determined by the probability of the
subtheories including the rules utilised in its construction.
Proposition 4.2 Let F1 = 〈T, 〈ΩPTF, FPTF, PPTF〉〉 be a PTF, and F2 = 〈GT ,S, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 its
corresponding PLF, i.e. F2 = PLF (PGF (F1)). For every argument A in AGT it holds that
PPLF(LA = ON) =
∑
{U∈Sub(T )|Rules(A)⊆U}
PPTF({U}).
We suggest that properties analogous to those given in propositions 4.1 and 4.2 should be regarded
as basic requirements in every proposal belonging to the constellations approach. Simple as they are,
such properties are out of the scope of approach focused on abstract argumentation only (see Subsection
5.2) and, as exemplified by the above discussion of [27], they are sometimes overlooked.
Turning to issues related to semantics evaluation, in Definition 15 of [27] the probability of a set
of argumentsA being an extension according to an argumentation semanticsX , denoted PXPAG(A), is
defined as the sum of the probabilities of subgraphs entailing this extension. The following equation
reformulates the original definition in terms of labellings, given that the probability that a set of argu-
mentsA is an extension according to an argumentation semanticsX is the probability that all and only
arguments in A are labelled IN according to anX-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling specification:
PXPAG(A) =
∑
H∈HX (A)
PPAG(H) (14)
where HX(A) = {H |H ∈ Sub(G) : A = IN(L) for some L ∈ LXH}. On the basis of Definition 4.2,
PXPAG(A) can be expressed equivalently in the context of PGFs given that of PPAG(H) = PPGF({H}).
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While any PAG can be captured by a PGF or the corresponding PLF (Definition 3.6) with
{ON, OFF}-labellings, we have to emphasise that the acceptance uncertainty captured by PLFs is pos-
sibly distinct from the uncertainty captured by PXPAG, and provides a more fine-grained probabilistic
evaluation of argument acceptance statuses, as illustrated in Example ??.
Example 3.1 (continuing from p. 20) Suppose the PAG 〈A,;, PPAG〉 and the PLF
〈〈A,;〉 , preferred-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉 have probability distributions as
given in Figure 13.
B C PPAG B C PPLF
H1 ON ON 1 IN OUT 0.4
H2 ON OFF 0 OUT IN 0.6
H3 OFF ON 0 IN OFF 0
H4 OFF OFF 0 OFF IN 0
OFF OFF 0
Figure 13: An example of relation and comparison between PAG and PLF.
We have that
• the distribution PPAG is such that PPAG(H1) = 1, reflecting that the inclusion of B and C have
probability 1; and
• the distribution PPLF is such that PPLF({〈{B}, {C}, ∅, ∅〉}) = 0.4 and
PPLF({〈{C}, {B}, ∅, ∅〉}) = 0.6, reflecting that the preferred extension {C} is more likely
than the preferred extension {B}.
The probability that the arguments B and C appear in a preferred extension/labelling is then different
in the two approaches:
• the probability that {B} is a preferred extension is 1, and equally for the set {C}, i.e P prPAG({B}) =
1 and P prPAG({C}) = 1;
• the probability that B is labelled IN is 0.4, while the probability that C is labelled IN is 0.6, i.e
P prPLF(LB = IN) = 0.4 and P
pr
PLF(LC = IN) = 0.6.
This example illustrates that the acceptance uncertainty addressed with PLFs is distinct from the
uncertainty subject of the constellations approach, and supports a more fine-grained probabilistic eval-
uation of acceptance statuses of arguments. 
To recap, we have shown that the approach of probabilistic labellings can capture the constellations
approach, but the latter cannot capture the former since probabilistic labellings allow a more fine-
grained probabilistic evaluation of argument acceptance statuses. Some basic properties, e.g. the fact
that the probability of inclusion of an argument cannot be greater than the probability of inclusion of
its subarguments, are directly derived in our framework. It turns out that the approach of probabilistic
labellings can be also related to another approach to probabilistic argumentation, namely the epistemic
approach, as we will see next.
4.2 Epistemic approach
In the epistemic approach, ‘the probability distribution over arguments is used directly to identify
which arguments are believed’ [27]. The idea is that in this case the argumentation framework is fixed
but an agent has an ‘extra epistemic information’ to assign an epistemic probability, denoted in the
following as PPEF, to each argument. Formally, given a set of argumentsA, PPEF : A → [0, 1]. Given
that this degree of belief is based on extra information, as exemplified in [27] it may be the case that
an agent assigns a high degree of belief to an argument which would be rejected according to the
acceptance labelling prescribed by the framework. Even more, in [27], it is assumed that the degrees of
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belief of an agent may even be inconsistent i.e. that PPEF may violate the probability axioms. Dealing
with inconsistencies is beyond the scope of the present paper, hence we restrict to consistent epistemic
probabilities in the following discussion, showing how they can be related to our approach.
First, we formalise the probability space for epistemic probabilities in our context.
Definition 4.3 (Probabilistic epistemic frame) A probabilistic epistemic frame (PEF) is a tu-
ple 〈G, 〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉〉 where G = 〈A,;, Z⇒〉 denotes an argumentation graph, and
〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉 is a probability space such that:
• the sample space ΩPEF is the set of subsets of A, i.e. Ω = 2A;
• the σ-algebra FPEF is the power set of ΩPEF, i.e. FPEF = 2ΩPEF ;
• the function PPEF from FPEF to [0, 1] is a probability distribution satisfying Kolmogorov axioms.
Each element of the sample space of a PEF is a set of arguments, an option for the unconstrained
choice of which arguments are believed. The epistemic probability, i.e. the degree of belief, of an
argument is the sum of the probabilities of the sets of arguments including it. So given a PEF tuple
〈G, 〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉〉, we have:
PPEF(A) =
∑
{E∈ΩPEF|A∈E}
PPEF({E}). (15)
Every PEF can be put in correspondence with a PLF based on the {IN, OUT, UN} labels, where the
label UN is not used. Basically the epistemic probability of each element of the sample space of a PEF,
i.e. of each set of arguments, is put in correspondence with the probability of a labelling where the
members of the set are labelled IN and the other arguments are labelled OUT.
Definition 4.4 (PLF corresponding to a PEF) Given a PEF 〈G, 〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉〉, its corre-
sponding PLF is a PLF tuple 〈G, {IN, OUT, UN}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉 whose probability distribution
PPLF is such that ∀S ∈ FPLF:
PPLF(S) =
∑
E∈E
PPEF({E})
where E = {E∈ΩPEF|∃L ∈ S : IN(L) = E , ∀A 6∈ E : L(A) = OUT}.
Definition 4.5 (PEF corresponding to a PLF)
Given a PLF 〈G, all-{IN, OUT, UN}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉, its corresponding PEF is a PEF tuple
〈G, 〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉〉 whose probability distribution PPEF is such that ∀S ∈ F :
PPEF(S) =
∑
L∈L
PPLF({L})
where L = {L ∈ L{IN,OUT,UN}(G) | ∃E ∈ S : E = IN(L)}.
So, each labelling L in the sample space of the PLF is put in correspondence with the set of argu-
ments IN(L) belonging to the sample space of a corresponding PEF. In particular, from Equation 15
and taking into account Proposition (4), we directly obtain for every argumentA in A:
PPEF(A) = PPLF(LA = IN). (16)
Example 3.1 (continuing from p. 20) Suppose the PEF 〈G, 〈ΩPEF, FPEF, PPEF〉〉 and the PLF
〈G, preferred-{IN, OUT, UN}, 〈ΩPLF, FPLF, PPLF〉〉, where the argumentation graph G is pictured in
Figure 8. Suppose that the probability acceptance of B and C are 0.4 and 0.6, respectively, then
we have PPEF(B) = P (LB = IN) = 0.4 and PPEF(C) = P (LC = IN) = 0.6. In this example,
values for the probabilities of acceptance are chosen to be consistent with respect to the preferred
extension/labellings. However, a distribution PPEF does not necessarily satisfy this constraint. For
example one may set PPEF({B,C}) > 0. 
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As mentioned in Example ??, the epistemic approach includes the consideration of possibly anoma-
lous probability distributions, and for this reason one may/should consider some desirable properties
for epistemic probabilities. In that regard, the proposed correspondences between PEFs and PLFs
preserve some desirable properties stated in [27] for such epistemic probabilities. In particular, an
epistemic probability PPEF is called ‘coherent’ if for every pair of arguments A and B such that A
attacks B it holds that PPEF(A) + PPEF(B) ≤ 1. Coherence implies a weaker property, called ‘ratio-
nality’ in [27], namely that if PPEF(A) > 0.5 then PPEF(B) ≤ 0.5. In our framework, coherence of
P (LA = IN) is ensured, provided that the labelling satisfies the minimal property of conflict freeness.
Proposition 4.3 Let 〈G, cf-{IN, OUT, UN}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF. Let A and B denote two arguments in
AG such that B attacks A.
P (LA = IN) + P (LB = IN) ≤ 1.
Proof 4.1 Let us denote LA the set of labellings where L(A) = IN, LB the set of labellings where
L(B) = IN, and L the complement set of labellings Ω\(LA ∪ LB). By conflict freeness, LA and LB
are disjoint, we have thus: P (LA) + P (LB) + P (L) = 1. By definition, P (LA) = P (LA = IN) and
P (LB) = P (LB = IN). We also have that P (L) ≥ 0. Therefore P (LA = IN) + P (LB = IN) ≤ 1. 
Further it is easy to see that P (LA = IN) satisfies other properties under additional mild assump-
tions. First of all an epistemic probability is said to be ‘founded’ [28] if every argument not receiving
any attack has probability 1. This property is directly achieved if one assumes complete labellings.
Proposition 4.4 Let 〈G, complete-{IN, OUT, UN}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF. Let A be any argument in AG
such that no arguments attack A.
P (LA = IN) = 1.
Proof 4.2 In the case of the complete-{IN, OUT, UN}-labelling, for any labelling L in the sample space
Ω, we have L(A) = IN, therefore P (LA = IN) = 1. In the case of the complete-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labelling, for any labelling L in the sample space Ω, we have L(A) 6= IN only if L(A) = OFF, therefore
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OFF) = 1. 
While some properties considered in the literature have a direct counterpart within the proposed
framework, as discussed above, for some others the situation is not so clearcut. Consider for instance
‘optimistic’ distributions proposed in [28]. Letting B denote the set of all the attackers of an argument
A, a distribution is optimistic if for every argumentA
P (LA = IN) ≥ 1−
∑
B∈B
P (LB = IN). (17)
Considering {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings, the constraint may become trivial in the case the probability of
some of the attackers of A is high (i.e. when
∑
B∈B P (LB = IN) ≥ 1). However, the constraint does
not always hold. For instance, if for every attackerB ofA the distribution is such thatP (LB = IN) = 0,
then the constraint becomes an equality, i.e. P (LA = IN) = 1 and is not necessarily satisfied.
So, epistemic probabilities can be put in direct correspondence with PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN}-
labellings, where the focus is on arguments labelled IN only. The basic properties of coherence and
foundedness introduced for epistemic probabilities have a counterpart in PLFs in terms of properties
of labellings, while other properties of epistemic probabilities like optimism have no counterparts and
their conceptual status is open to discussion (see [4] for a more extensive analysis on this point).
Moreover, our proposal allows one to directly extend the notion of epistemic probability from
arguments to argument conclusions: it is rather natural to assume that the final goal of an agent is to
express his/her degrees of belief on the statements about which arguments are built, rather than just
about arguments.
As a matter of fact, in [27] the probability of a claim is derived from the probability on the underly-
ing logical models, which is used as input information, independently of the probability of arguments.
Indeed, in this context, the probability of each claim can be computed directly from the input informa-
tion without argument construction. The probability of each argument is also computed from the input
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information and has no effect on the probability of the relevant claim (cf. Proposition 5 of [27] where
it is shown that the probability of a claim is not less than the probability of any argument supporting
it). In our rule-based approach, using the probability on subtheories as input, the probability of claims
is evaluated through the argument construction process, which, more coherently with the notion of
argument-based reasoning, plays a central role. Further, our approach allows a fine-grained uncertain
evaluation of claims, with probabilities associated with all the relevant labels, while in [27] a binary
evaluation of claims is implicitly adopted.
To recap, the epistemic approach can be put in correspondence with the approach of probabilis-
tic labellings through PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings. In such PLFs, some desirable epis-
temic properties like ‘coherence’ and ‘foundedness’ are guaranteed under some basic assumptions, like
conflict-freeness, whereas other properties do not hold in general. Then, while in [27] the probability
of a claim can be computed without argument construction, in our proposal the probability of claims
is evaluated through the construction of arguments, an account which appears more coherent with the
notion of argument-based reasoning. Eventually, probabilistic labellings can capture a combination of
the constellations and epistemic approaches, as we will see next.
4.3 Combining the constellations and the epistemic approach
The constellations and epistemic approaches have been treated separately in the previous literature as
referring to different types of uncertainty. It is worth remarking, however, that they are, so to say,
orthogonal. Consequently, a situation where both types of uncertainty are present cannot be excluded:
an agent may be uncertain about which argumentation graph to actually consider and, at the same time,
may have different degrees of belief about the arguments accepted in the actual (unknown) argumenta-
tion graph.
PLFs based on {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings provide a way to encompass jointly the two kinds
of uncertainty. In fact, extending to this kind of labelling the reasoning illustrated in the previous
sections, the probability of inclusion of an argument A corresponds to P (LA 6= OFF) (also denoted as
P (LA = ON)), while the epistemic probability of A corresponds to P (LA = IN).
The correspondences between the different probabilistic approaches preserve essential properties
in the generalised framework. For example, propositions 4.3 and 4.4 can be turned into propositions
4.5 and 4.6 to take into account the inclusion status of arguments.
Proposition 4.5 Let 〈G, cf-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF. Let A and B denote two argu-
ments in AG such that B attacks A.
P (LA = IN) + P (LB = IN) ≤ 1.
Proposition 4.6 Let 〈G, complete-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF. Let A be any argument in
AG such that no arguments attack A.
P (LA = IN) + P (LA = OFF) = 1.
Other propositions can be derived, for example, to relate the probability of acceptance and inclusion of
arguments, cf. Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.7 Let 〈G, cf-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, and let A denote any argument in
AG.
P (LA = IN) ≤ P (LA = ON).
Corollary 4.1 Let 〈G, cf-{IN, OUT, UN, OFF}, 〈Ω, F, P 〉〉 be a PLF, and let A and B denote two argu-
ments in AG such that A is a subargument of B.
P (LB = IN) ≤ P (LA = ON).
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Eventually, our proposal is able to capture in a formal way the effect of the combination of these
different kinds of uncertainty on argument conclusions, in particular in the case where a multi-labelling
semantics is adopted, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.1 (continuing from p. 5) Suppose that the research scientist, in light of some previous ex-
periences, estimates that the acceptance of C is twice more credible than the acceptance ofD, whenever
the choice is open, namely in the cases where they are both labelled UN by grounded semantics in the
example at the end of Section 3. To convey this, she decides to adopt preferred {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-
labellings, and thus the labellings for arguments and statements illustrated in Figure 14 are now
deemed possible.
B1 B2 B C D ¬b1 ¬b2 ¬b c ¬c
L1 OFF OFF OFF OUT IN off off off out in
L2 OFF OFF OFF IN OUT off off off in out
L3 IN OFF OFF OUT IN in off off out in
L4 IN OFF OFF IN OUT in off off in out
L5 OFF IN OFF OUT IN off in off out in
L6 OFF IN OFF IN OUT off in off in out
L7 IN IN IN OUT IN in in in out in
Figure 14: Argument and statement labellings with preferred semantics.
Then, the different argument labellings are assigned the following probabilities:
P ({L1}) = (1− 0.5)× (1− 0.2)× (1/3) (≈ 0.13)
P ({L2}) = (1− 0.5)× (1− 0.2)× (2/3) (≈ 0.27)
P ({L3}) = 0.5× (1− 0.2)× (1/3) (≈ 0.13)
P ({L4}) = 0.5× (1− 0.2)× (2/3) (≈ 0.27)
P ({L5}) = (1− 0.5)× 0.2× (1/3) (≈ 0.03)
P ({L6}) = (1− 0.5)× 0.2× (2/3) (≈ 0.07)
P ({L7}) = 0.5× 0.2 (= 0.1)
The following probabilistic labelling of statements can then be derived.
P (K¬b = in) = P ({L7}) (= 0.1)
P (K¬b = off) = 1− P ({L7}) (= 0.9)
P (Kc = in) = P ({L2}) + P ({L4}) + P ({L6}) (≈ 0.61)
P (Kc = out) = 1− P (Kc = in) (≈ 0.39)
P (K¬c = in) = P ({L1}) + P ({L3}) + P ({L5}) + P ({L7}) (≈ 0.39)
P (K¬c = out) = 1− P (K¬c = in) (≈ 0.61)
On the basis of arguments and their approximate probabilities of being included or accepted in
an argumentative reasoning, we have derived that the overall probability of acceptance of statement
c (‘the program is running’) is approximately 0.61 while the probability of acceptance of ¬c (‘the
program is not running’) is estimated at 0.39. 
To sum up this section, probabilistic labellings can capture the constellations approach but not vice
versa because probabilistic labellings yield a more fine-grained probabilistic evaluation of argument
acceptance statuses. Probabilistic labellings can also be put in correspondence with the epistemic
approach, and provide a formal tool to back or question its assertions. Finally, the constellations and
epistemic approaches can be seamlessly combined using probabilistic labellings.
33
5 Discussion of Related Literature
We relate in this section our proposal with other relevant literature on probabilistic argumentation.
We classify these works into three groups: probabilistic structured argumentation (Subsection 5.1),
probabilistic abstract argumentation (Subsection 5.2), and other approaches connecting argumentation
and probability at different levels (Subsection 5.3).
5.1 Probabilistic structured argumentation
A significant amount of work on probabilistic argumentation concerned structured argumentation
where the origin and structure of arguments are explicitly dealt with. These are discussed next, distin-
guishing between those which, like in our proposal, use or can be easily related to abstract argumen-
tation frameworks for argument or statement acceptance evaluation and those which have little or no
relation with this formalism.
5.1.1 Probabilistic structured argumentation related to Dung’s framework
Several structured probabilistic argumentation constructs in the literature use or can be easily related
to Dung’s framework, as a component for the evaluation of argument or statement acceptance in the
context of a staged process analogous to the one presented in this paper.
For instance, the probability of the defeasible status of a conclusion is employed in [54] to de-
termine strategies to maximise the chances of winning legal disputes, in the context of a multi-layer
argumentation formalism based on Defeasible Logic, which can be interpreted in terms of Dung’s
framework [22, 34]. In this work, the probability of the defeasible status of a conclusion is the sum
of cases where this status is entailed. A case is a set of premises which are assumed independent; the
treatment of uncertainty in this context can be seen as a restricted account of PTFs.
The probability to win a legal dispute, and thus the probability that arguments and statements get
accepted by an adjudicator is explored in [53], on the basis of a probabilistic variant of a rule-based
argumentation framework akin to the framework in [47]. The proposal has a focus on the computa-
tion of probabilities of acceptance reflecting moves in a dialogue, with a particular emphasis on the
distinction between the probability of the event of construction of an argument and the probability of
acceptance of an argument. Premises of arguments are assumed independent, so that the probability
of an argument is the product of the probability of its premises. [52] further developed the idea of
computing the probability of the event of an argument to a rule-based argumentation framework where
premises are rules, a treatment which is similar to PTFs. The setting in [52] relaxes the assumption
of independent rules by associating a potential with theories. The potentials are then learned through
reinforcement learning to match the softmax policies of reinforced learning agents.
A probabilistic development of a rule-based argumentation system inspired from the ASPIC+ for-
malism is proposed in [48]. The framework shares with [52] multiple intuitions and similar results,
in particular a treatment of probabilistic rules which is close to our PTFs, and a notion of theory state
which corresponds to our notion of subtheory.
A probabilistic argumentation formalism built on Assumption-Based Argumentation [7] is intro-
duced in [13] for jury-based dispute resolution. Arguments are constructed from a set of probabilistic
rules and they are evaluated in the context of probabilistic frameworks with Dung’s grounded seman-
tics. Every juror has a different probability space to model the fact that they may reach different
probabilistic conclusions for the same case.
The present work can be regarded as a systematic generalisation of the ideas presented in these
papers at a more initial level, with dedicated formalisms and/or within specific application contexts.
It provides a framework where these proposals can be placed, their structure analysed in a principled
way and their properties investigated in a domain independent manner.
5.1.2 Other probabilistic structured argumentation
A few other works in the literature deal with probabilistic argumentation within formalisms which are
not relying on Dung’s framework for the evaluation of arguments.
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A probabilistic setting for non-monotonic reasoning is investigated in [24]. In this proposal, uncer-
tainty concerns the truth values assumed by some propositional variables called probabilistic variables
which are a strict subset of the whole set of variables of interest for an agent. A total assignment of
truth values to the probabilistic variables is called a scenario, and basically the agent is uncertain about
which scenario to choose. The agent is also equipped with a knowledge base Φ, which is assumed to
be certain, and the chosen scenario must be consistent with Φ, i.e. the scenario and Φ together must
not entail contradictory conclusions. A consistent scenario is called an argument for a conclusion ϕ if,
together with Φ, it entails the truth of the conclusion, while it is called counterargument for ϕ if, to-
gether with the given knowledge base, it entails the falsity of the conclusion. In this sense, an argument
can be understood as a consistent set of assumptions, somehow similarly to assumption-based argu-
mentation, but with the difference that this set of assumptions, being a scenario, is exhaustive. Note
that inconsistent scenarios are ruled out and that a consistent scenario may neither be an argument nor
a counterargument for ϕ, if it does not entail neither the truth nor the falsity of ϕ. Moreover, a scenario
may be, at the same time, an argument for several conclusions and a counterargument for several oth-
ers. According to this peculiar notion of argument, there is no notion of argument acceptance in this
context, since every scenario stands alone and the arguments and counterarguments corresponding to
each scenario cannot be in conflict. For this reason the approach focuses on argument conclusions: on
the basis of the probability of each scenario, it is possible to define the probability of a conclusion being
supported, being rejected and of being neither supported nor rejected. From these values the notions
of degree of support, degree of possibility, and degree of ignorance of a conclusion are defined. While,
as evidenced above, this proposal adopts a quite specific notion of argument with respect to the liter-
ature, it may be remarked that some of its elements can be put in correspondence with our approach:
uncertainty about the probabilistic variables can be regarded as a quite restricted case of PTF, and the
degrees of support, possibility, and ignorance can be connected to, respectively, the probability for a
statement of being labelled in, of not being labelled out and of being labelled unp.
The probability on statement statuses is catered for in [57], tackling similar issues as introduced in
[53], but without concerns for reflecting the structure of dialogues and without using Dung’s frame-
work. The authors defined a probabilistic argumentation logic and implemented it with the language
CHRiSM [56], which is a rule-based probabilistic logic programming language based on Constraint
Handling Rules (CHR) [19] associated with a high-level probabilistic programming language called
PRISM [55]5. They discussed how it can be seen as a probabilistic generalization of the defeasible
logic proposed by [41], and showed how it provides a method to determine the initial probabilities
from a given body of precedents. Rules in CHRiSM have an attached probability and each rule is
applied with respect to its probability. Thus, also in this case, probabilistic uncertainty can be related
to a sort of PTF.
5.2 Probabilistic abstract argumentation
Several works focus on extending Dung’s formalism of abstract argumentation frameworks with prob-
abilistic information, independently of any underlying mechanism of argument construction and of any
intended goal of statement evaluation.
5.2.1 Constellations approach
The proposal in [36], which can be regarded as the starting point of the constellations approach, makes
a strong assumption of independence on the inclusion of arguments, as already commented in Section
4. It has also to be mentioned that, differently from our proposal, attacks are also uncertain in [36]:
given a pair of argumentsA and B the fact that A attacks B is subject to a probabilistic evaluation and
this attack may be present or not in different frameworks where bothA andB are included. In the rule-
based construction of arguments adopted in the present paper, we do not consider uncertainty about
attacks, since in our context the fact that an argument attacks another is deterministic. Encompassing
uncertainty about attacks through a generalised labelling approach, where also attacks are labelled,
does not appear to pose specific technical difficulties and can be exploited in future work.
5This language must not be confused with the system PRISM for probabilistic model checking developed by [26].
35
In the context of the formal framework of [36], further work [15] investigates the computational
complexity of computing the probability of a family of binary predicates, whose truth value depends on
the actual structure of the argumentation framework. These predicates concern the fact that a given set
of arguments is an extension according to a given semantics, so they are parametric with respect to the
chosen semantics. Admissible and stable semantics turn out to be tractable in this respect, while other
semantics are not. This analysis has been extended in [16] where it is shown that lifting the assumption
of independence leads to intractability in all cases. The analysis is complemented in [17] by Monte-
Carlo simulations for the efficient estimation of the probability values in the intractable cases. In a
parallel line of research, the semantics of probabilistic argumentation is formulated in [38, 39] by
characterising subgraphs in relation to an extension, possibly leading to more efficient algorithms to
deal with the complexity of the constellations approach.
The limits of the independence assumption about the inclusion of arguments is also acknowledged
in [37], which utilises evidential argumentation frameworks/systems [42, 43] to lift the assumption.
The formalism uses a special argument, denoted as η, to represent evidence and introduces a relation
of support between arguments, which is regarded as uncertain, leading to the notion of Probabilistic
Evidential Argumentation Frameworks (PrEAFs), where a probability value is associated with each
support. Our proposal does resort to neither specific notions like incontrovertible premises nor to a
specific evidence-based interpretation of the notion of support. We rather point out that the generic
notion of subargument creates by itself a dependence among arguments and induces some legality
constraints, as explained in Section 2.
The work presented in [11] shows some closer similarities to ours. First, it introduces a notion of
probabilistic argumentation framework where a joint probability distribution P over the set of argu-
ments is given. For any argument A, P (A) denotes the probability that A holds ‘in isolation, before
the dialectical process starts.’ This notion is coherent with the constellations approach and with the
kind of uncertainty we capture with {ON, OFF}-labellings. It is worth remarking that, by assuming a
joint probability distribution over arguments, this work does not rely on any independence assump-
tion. Similarly to our approach, [11] advances a distinct probability assessment with reference to
{IN, OUT, UN}-labellings for arguments. Several differences are however worth pointing out. First, at
a representation level, the label OUT also covers the cases where an argument is not included in a
framework, namely the cases which we separately label as OFF. Second, only grounded and preferred
semantics are explicitly considered in [11]. Third, and more importantly, in [11], the probabilities of
acceptance, rejection and undecidedness of an argument A (i.e. the probabilities that A is labelled
IN, OUT, or UN respectively) are assumed to be computable from the initial probabilities of the argu-
ments in isolation (and indeed an algorithm is provided to carry out this computation), while this is
not the case in our approach. This point deserves a specific comment also because an analogous as-
sumption is adopted in other works belonging to the constellations approach [36, 17] in the context of
extension-based semantics. In our approach, a semantics can produce multiple labellings for a given
(sub) framework. So, an agent can assign different probability values to each labelling. This captures
uncertainty about the selection of acceptance labellings even when there is no uncertainty about the
inclusion of arguments in the frameworks; this type of acceptance uncertainty is not addressed in [11].
To exemplify, if for every argumentA, P (A) = 1 or P (A) = 0, i.e. there is only one possible (and ac-
tually certain) subframework of the original framework, in [11] the probability of acceptance, rejection
or undecidedness of every arguments is either 1 or 0 in turn (this holds for all the evaluation alternatives
in the paper, namely grounded, sceptical preferred, and credulous preferred). As a consequence of the
different assumptions on the nature of uncertainty to be represented, this constraint does not hold in
our approach as far as multiple status semantics, like preferred semantics, are concerned. Clearly, these
different assumptions may be appropriate in different domains: comparing the suitability of the various
existing approaches to the needs of distinct application contexts is left to future work.
The interest in combinations of argumentation and probability is also witnessed by the MARF
(Markov Argumentation Random Field) software system based on the combination of abstract argu-
mentation and Markov random fields presented in [58]. In [58], argument acceptability status can take
four values: accepted (A), rejected (R), undecided (U), and ignored (I). and the system computes a
probabilistic acceptability distribution on these values. Exploring in detail the relationships between
these values and our labels and investigating the integration of our approach with Markov Random
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Field theory appear to be interesting lines of future development.
5.2.2 Epistemic approach
Besides the constellations approach, other works interpret probabilities associated with abstract argu-
ments according to the epistemic approach which is originally introduced in [59] and further developed
in [29, 30]. An equational approach to probabilistic abstract argumentation which bears some similar-
ity with the epistemic approach of [59] is studied in [20], where a syntactical and a semantical method
to the definition of the probabilities of arguments are proposed. [4] explored an alternative setting
for epistemic probabilities in abstract argumentation by using De Finetti’s theory of subjective prob-
abilities [10] rather than Kolmogorov’s axiomatization. Moreover they preliminarily investigated the
extension of the approach to the case of imprecise probabilities [71].
The variety of flavours in probabilistic argumentation presented in the above cited papers suggests
that the interpretation of the probability of an argument is, in an epistemic sense, a largely open is-
sue and that a finer classification could be devised, where the generic notion of epistemic probability
considered up to now in the literature is replaced by a more detailed taxonomy. While this interesting
direction of investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, we remark that the above mentioned papers
typically resort to an intuitive explanation of the intended meaning of epistemic probability and assume
as a starting point that the epistemic probability is given, leaving implicit the underlying probability
space. As discussed in Section 4, our formalism is able to capture, at a formal level, an assignment
of epistemic probabilities to arguments as a special case of probabilistic {IN, OUT, UN}-labellings based
on a well-identified probability space. In the same formal setting, an epistemic probability assignment
corresponding to a generic probabilistic {IN, OUT, UN}-labelling is identified, showing that we recover,
in our context, some of the desirable technical properties introduced in other papers. In this sense,
we do not commit to any specific intuitive interpretation of epistemic probabilities but rather provide
a reference formal framework which can be employed for further analyses of this notion not only at
the abstract level, on which the above cited papers are focused, but also concerning its origin at the
structured level and its impact on the evaluation of argument conclusions.
5.3 Other connections between argumentation and probability
While the approach proposed in this paper and those previously overviewed focus on modelling prob-
abilistic uncertainty in the context of the various steps of formal argumentative reasoning, other kinds
of connections and interactions between argumentation and probabilistic notions have been conceived;
we discuss them in the following.
At a foundational level, some works use basic probabilistic notions to give an interpretation of
defeasible rules in argumentative reasoning. In particular Pollock [45] uses the notion of statistical
syllogism to define prima facie reasons. Briefly, in the simplest form, if F holds and the conditional
probability that G holds given that F holds is above a given threshold (typically 0.5) then there is a
prima facie reason to (defeasibly) inferG. In this view, basic probability concepts (in particular the no-
tion of conditioning) are, in a sense, regarded as more fundamental than argumentative notions which
are a sort of derived concept, at least from an epistemological point of view. As discussed by Verheij
in [67], Pollock however did criticise other aspects of probabilistic reasoning leading to a sort of ‘anti-
probabilistic stance’. To reconcile Pollock’s foundational perspective with standard probability laws,
Verheij proposes a reformulation of the notion of prima facie reason, and shows how it addresses some
of Pollock’s criticisms. In the same foundational strain, Verheij [66] proposes to combine basic notions
from nonmonotonic reasoning and probability theories to formalise ampliative arguments, namely de-
feasible arguments going ‘beyond their premises’. Again, a standpoint is assumed that argumentative
notions can be interpreted in terms of more fundamental (or more primitive) concepts, probability being
one of them. Discussing foundational issues is beyond the scope of the present paper, which deals with
combining probability and argumentation at a different level: independently of the possible interpreta-
tion of defeasible rules in probabilistic terms, there can be uncertainty about which rules are adopted,
which arguments are built, which of the built arguments are accepted and so on. In this sense, our
study of probabilistic uncertainty inside the process of argumentative reasoning can be understood as
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complementary to the study of how the defeasible rules in argumentative reasoning can be interpreted
in probabilistic terms.
Connections between argumentation and one of the most popular probability-based formalisms,
namely Bayesian networks, have also attracted a lot of attention in the recent years, also due to some
basic similarities in the graph-based representations adopted in both areas. For instance, in [25] Wig-
more charts (a graphical formalism useful for ‘describing and organizing the available evidence in
a case and in following reasoning processes through sequential steps’) and Bayesian networks are
compared by using them to model the infamous Sacco and Vanzetti case. Several pros and cons of
both formalisms are discussed and then attention is focused on making the construction of Bayesian
networks for complex legal cases more manageable by introducing a hierarchical object-oriented ap-
proach utilising ‘small modular networks (or network fragments) as building blocks’. This idea is
further pursued in [18] where in order to avoid ad hoc construction of Bayesian networks several basic
structures, called idioms, for the representation of legal cases are introduced. Differently from [25],
this work does not assume a specific argument representation. In the same line, but adopting a different
formal background, [23] proposes a translation from the Carneades argument model into a Bayesian
network providing it a probabilistic semantics.
Other approaches follow, so to say, the converse direction: they assume that a Bayesian network
representing a case is given and investigate how to produce an argument-based representation for it [69,
33], under the assumption that this provides a simpler and more intuitive presentation. For example,
given a Bayesian network, in [60, 61, 62] a support graph is derived whose nodes can be associated
with a numerical support, based on the original probabilistic information [62]. Arguments can then be
identified on the basis of the support graph [61].
Further works [68, 64] incorporate a third kind of representation commonly adopted in legal rea-
soning, namely scenarios and explore various kind of (pairwise and threewise) connections and com-
binations between them, probability and argumentation.
All the above cited works assume as a starting point that argumentation and probability theory pro-
vide complementary/competing formalisms for representing the same situation and, investigate, from
a general knowledge representation perspective, their relative merits and disadvantages, and various
options for connecting, deriving or combining these formalisms. In this context, argumentation for-
malisms are essentially seen as descriptive tools (as in the case of Wigmore charts) while the (numeric)
assessment of conclusions is typically assigned by Bayesian networks.
Our approach is different in that it does not follow the perspective of two competing formalisms
and involves a simple but full-fledged argumentation-based reasoning process where argument and
conclusion assessments are carried out on the basis of argumentation semantics and the related notions
of justifications. As already remarked, probability theory is used with the specific purpose of capturing
various kinds of uncertainty that can be present in this process. Addressing knowledge representation
issues and inter-formalism comparisons is beyond the scope of the present paper and represents an
interesting direction of future work.
6 Conclusion
The main contribution of the paper is a labelling-oriented framework for probabilistic argumentation.
The approach builds on an articulated account of an argumentation process, involving the four main
stages of rule-based argument construction, argument graph definition, argument evaluation, and state-
ment evaluation. We have considered various forms of uncertainty which can be present in these stages,
casted them into a formal probabilistic setting and analysed their relationships.
Differently from other proposals in the literature employing the well-established Dung’s abstract
argumentation frameworks, we have adopted semi-abstract argumentation graphs where the key role
of the subargument relation is taken into account to express dependences between the events of inclu-
sion/exclusion of arguments. Moreover, uncertainty about the inclusion of arguments can be combined
with uncertainty about their acceptance through the notion of {IN, OUT, UN, OFF}-labellings under suit-
able legality constraints. In particular, we have shown that the proposed approach can capture key
concepts underlying the so-called constellations and epistemic approaches or a combination of both,
and that it can ease the analysis of their properties. Some of these properties are easily retrieved by
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derivation in our context, while it has been evidenced that the status of other properties is more open
to discussion.
Along the road, we also evidenced key correspondences between probabilistic settings at different
levels. Since different models of probabilistic argumentation found in the literature are akin to these
settings, we believe that these correspondences can be helpful to position novel proposals too within
the whole picture of probabilistic argumentation.
At a general level, the main lessons learnt along this journey concern diversity and unification in
this research field. Diversity arises from the fact that ‘probabilistic argumentation’ is far from being
a univocal term, leading in the literature to statements like ‘What is meant by the probability of an
argument holding is an open question. Indeed, there seem to be various ways that we could answer
this.’ [27].
To account for this diversity while avoiding the risk of confusion and ambiguity, two aspects turned
out to be crucial: analysing the argumentation process in its entirety, from argument construction to
statement assessment, and specifying in detail the probability space (in particular the sample space)
whenever some form of uncertainty arises. Analysing all phases of the argumentation process allows
to situate distinct forms of uncertainty ‘in the right place’, and detailed specification of the probability
space avoids ambiguity about their nature, since the events one is uncertain about are formally identi-
fied. Simple as they are, these specifications are most often left implicit or ambiguous in the literature.
We believe therefore that both aspects provide a contribution to the need of conceptual clarity in the
field. In particular, they are essential to carry out an analysis of the relationships and possible depen-
dences between the different forms of uncertainty, which is only partially doable when they are held in
isolation or are not clearly specified. An example of this kind of analysis is the distinction between the
probability of a set of arguments being an extension as usually conceived in the constellations approach
and the probability of a labelling in our probabilistic labelling frames. While, at a superficial level, they
could be seen as similar, we have shown that the former can be regarded as a derived notion in the con-
text of probabilistic graph frames, while the latter refers to a completely distinct form of uncertainty
in the context of probabilistic labelling frames. Suggestions for a critical reappraisal of some concepts
adopted in non-probabilistic argumentation are another byproduct of this analysis, as exemplified by
the discussion about probabilistic argument justification labellings.
While accounting for a diversity of uncertainties is essential, it has also to be acknowledged that
they may be present together, leading to the unification problem: how to combine them within a formal
framework, able to generalise some existing approaches and to provide a uniform treatment of diverse
uncertainties. Probabilistic labellings turned out to be a suitable tool to this purpose.
Future directions are multiple. We may lay down compact representations through probabilis-
tic rules or factors, paving the way to possible integration of probabilistic argumentation with well-
established probabilistic graphical models and machine learning techniques to address the parametrisa-
tion and valuation of such models. In addition, we mentioned possible use of non-classical approaches
to probability (e.g. De Finetti’s subjective probabilities) in this context as an alternative to the classical
definition of probability function based on Kolmogorov axioms we adopted here. Moreover, the argu-
mentation process in this paper is rule-based: extending our analysis to other forms of argumentation
(e.g. dialogical) is another direction of future work. Finally, our investigation is entirely formal and
independent from any particular domain. However, some domains may require to capture some partic-
ular features. For example, as mentioned in Section 5, a variety of research proposed a combination
of different argumentation and probabilistic models to address diverse aspects of uncertainty in legal
reasoning. More generally, it would be interesting to see how probabilistic labellings could better help
to characterise diverse aspects of uncertainty in specific application domains.
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Notation
Some key notations used in the paper.
T A defeasible theory
G An argumentation graph
ArgLab A set of labels for arguments
l A label for arguments
L A labelling function of arguments
LA The random labelling of an argumentA
L A set of random labellings of arguments
LitLabels A set of labels for literals
k A label for literals
K A labelling function of literals
Kϕ The random labelling of literal ϕ
K A set of random labellings of literals
LArgLab(G) The set of ArgLab-labellings of the argumentation graphG
S AnX-ArgLab-labelling specification
LXArgLab(G) The set ofX-ArgLab-labellings of the argumentation graphG, iden-
tified by the X-ArgLab-labelling specification
PTF A probabilistic theory frame
PGF A probabilistic graph frame
PLF A probabilistic labelling frame
PAG A probabilistic argumentation graph (from [27])
PEF A probabilistic epistemic frame
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